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The conversation-stopping question “How should judges
decide cases?” has remained the central question in the theory of
law.1
I answer [the question of what constitutes a denial of equal
protection by looking to] the “time-dated” meaning of equal
protection in 1868.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In interpreting constitutional provisions3 and adjudicating constitutional
issues, judges refer to the United States Constitution’s text, structure,
history, precedential readings, juridical constructions, and traditions as
pertinent factors.4 That the latter factor, tradition, has always played
some role in the Court’s interpretive enterprise5 is not remarkable.6
Tradition can be important, for “constitutional interpretation must take
into account past legal and political practice as well as what the framers
themselves intended to say.”7 What is remarkable and worthy of
1. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?
107 (1996).
2. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 148–49 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
3. Interpretation is, of course, a necessary function, because the Constitution does
not and cannot interpret itself. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President
and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1994).
4. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 119–22 (1993);
Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1185–94 (1996); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 76 & n.20 (1991); Renata
Adler, Irreparable Harm, NEW REPUBLIC, July 30, 2001, at 29, 34.
5. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Bradwell
v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393, 407, 426 (1857).
6. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 192 (1996)
(“Though it is traditional for Supreme Court justices to rely on tradition, today some
scholars and judges seem to pay more lip service to history and tradition than ever.”); id.
at 198 (“Throughout its recent history . . . the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment must be interpreted in view of our ‘history and
traditions.’”); Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 178 (1993)
(“‘Tradition’ . . . has been an important source of authority for almost all schools of
constitutional interpretation.” (footnote omitted)).
7. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 9–10 (1996); see also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
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comment and analysis is the view, articulated and championed by Justice
Antonin Scalia, that traditionalism—the interpretation and application of
the Constitution “in accordance with the long-standing and evolving
practices, experiences, and tradition of the nation”8—can and should
play a dispositive role in constitutional law and adjudication.9 The
Justice, looking to and relying on his notion of traditionalism in cases
involving the preservative and tradition protecting Due Process Clause,10
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996) (“The central traditionalist idea is that
one should be very careful about rejecting judgments made by people who were acting
reflectively and in good faith, especially when those judgments have been reaffirmed or
at least accepted over time.”).
8. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1133 (1998).
Traditionalism is the idea that the words of the Constitution should be
understood as they have been understood by the people over the course of our
constitutional history, from enactment through the present. To accomplish
this, the interpreter looks at what decentralized and representative bodies have
done, over time, and treats their consensus as authoritative.
Id. at 1136.
9. During Scalia’s confirmation hearings before the United States Senate, Senator
Howard Metzenbaum quoted Scalia as having said in an earlier article:
It would seem to be a contradiction in terms to suggest that a State practice
engaged in and widely regarded as legitimate from the early days of the
Republic down to the present time, is unconstitutional. I do not care how
analytically consistent with analogous precedents such a holding might be, nor
how socially desirable in a judge’s view. If it contradicts long and continuing
understanding of the society, as many of the Supreme Court’s recent
Constitutional decisions . . . , in fact, do, it is quite simply wrong.
Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate,
99th Cong. 88 (1986). Senator Howard Metzenbaum was concerned that Justice Scalia’s
view suggested that “the Constitution means what the majority says it means,” id. at 89,
and asked, as does this Article, how Justice Scalia’s approach could be squared with the
Court’s ruling outlawing segregated public schools. See id. at 88. Justice Scalia
answered that discrimination on the basis of race was unconstitutional because it was
“facially contrary” to the language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 88–89; see also
TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 13 (2000)
(discussing Justice Scalia’s testimony regarding tradition and the Constitution). For
more on this subject, see infra notes 291–95 and accompanying text.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. at amend. XIV (“No State shall . . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). The
“Due Process Clause is generally tradition-protecting . . . [and] safeguards rights related
to those long-established in Anglo-American law.” Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Leaving Things Undecided]; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT
CONSTITUTIONS DO 67 (2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY]
(discussing preservative constitutions that “attempt to protect long-standing practices
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has urged that the United States Supreme Court should “refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified;”11 that a plaintiff
seeking to maintain a substantive due process claim must demonstrate
“that the State has deprived him of a right historically and traditionally
protected against state interference;”12 and that abortion is not a
protected liberty because “the Constitution says absolutely nothing about
it, and . . . the longstanding traditions of American society have permitted it
to be legally proscribed.”13
In other cases construing and applying the transformative and tradition
correcting Equal Protection Clause,14 Justice Scalia has argued that
fundamental constitutional rights “should be limited to ‘interest[s]
traditionally protected by our society;’”15 that the Court should not strike
down a practice “not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of
Rights” where that practice “bears the endorsement of a long tradition of
open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning
of the Republic;”16 and that the meaning of equal protection is “timedated” circa 1868.17 This Article examines Justice Scalia’s traditionalism
and applies that methodology to the results reached by the Court in
Brown v. Board of Education18 and Loving v. Virginia.19 Brown, of
that, it is feared, will be endangered by momentary passions”); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1183,
1185 (2000) (“The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the
Due Process issue whether an existing or time-honored convention, described at the
appropriate level of generality, is violated by the practice under attack.” (quoting Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between
Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988))).
11. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127–28 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
12. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
13. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). The Equal Protection Clause
“might be thought to have some counterhistorical content.” Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 38 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING
DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 68 (noting the transformative elements of the
Constitution “rejecting slavery and authorizing the national government to do a great
deal to promote equality”); Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 10, at 67
(“[T]he Equal Protection Clause is tradition-correcting . . . [and] sets out a normative
ideal that operates as a critique of existing practices . . . .”).
15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (Scalia, J.)).
16. Id. at 568 (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
17. See SCALIA, supra note 2, at 149.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

288

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

[VOL. 40: 285, 2003]

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

Applying Scalian Traditionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

course, officially interred the nation’s longstanding, traditional, and noxious
separate-but-equal doctrine. Justice Scalia has argued that tradition did
not require a different outcome in that case because, in his view, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, when combined
with the Thirteenth Amendment, “leaves no room for doubt that laws
treating people differently because of their race are invalid.”20 Loving
held that antimiscegenation laws prohibiting marriage and sexual
relations between Blacks and Whites were unconstitutional.21 In Justice
Scalia’s view, adherence to tradition would not have required the Court
to uphold such laws, as “[a]ny tradition in that case was contradicted by
a text—an Equal Protection Clause that explicitly establishes racial
equality as a constitutional value.”22
The discussion proceeds as follows: Part II focuses on Brown and
Loving and the traditionalist arguments made to the Court by the state
defendants who sought to preserve and maintain the segregationist status
quo. Part III turns to and surveys Justice Scalia’s traditionalism in Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses cases.23 Part IV evaluates Scalian
20. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95 n.1. It has been reported that, in a speech given at
Columbia Law School, Justice Scalia indicated that he would vote against the plaintiffs
in Brown if the case was one of first impression. See Patricia J. Williams, Postcard from
Heathrow: Diary of a Mad Law Professor, NATION, May 5, 1997, at 8. While not
ignoring this report, this Article assumes that Justice Scalia’s Rutan dissent sets forth his
official position on Brown.
21. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. The word “miscegenation” is a combination of “the
Latin words miscere (‘to mix’) and genus (‘race’) . . . .” RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 20 (2003). The term
“miscegenation” was first used in an 1864 pamphlet discussing the theory of the
blending of the races. Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law Would Rule Between
Us”: Antimiscegenation, the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate over
Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 873, 896 n.93 (1995). “Miscegenation
is an awkward term to use . . . ; the implication it carries is that ‘race’ is a meaningful
construct and that sex and reproduction between the races is something akin to bestiality.
But it is impossible to write about anti-miscegenation laws without using the term.”
Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against
Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559, 560 n.1 (2000).
22. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980 n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Justice Scalia’s traditionalism is not and should not be confused with two other
interpretive methodologies, originalism and textualism. “Originalism is the idea that the
words of the Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying
public at the time of enactment.” McConnell, supra note 8, at 1136; see also RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13–25 (2001). “The advocates of
originalism argue that the meaning of the Constitution (or of its individual clauses) was
fixed at the moment of its adoption, and that the task of interpretation is accordingly to
ascertain that meaning and apply it to the issue at hand.” JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL

289

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

traditionalism, and applies the methodology to the separate-but-equal
and antimiscegenation laws challenged in Brown and Loving, decisions
which rejected and broke with discriminatory traditions, which are an
unfortunate, but very real, part of this nation’s history.24 In doing so,
this Article takes issue with Scalia’s position that the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the entrenched institutions and
manifestation of apartheid and Jim Crowism.25 Application of Scalian
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION, at xiii (1996)
(emphasis omitted). This interpretive approach “is what remains in American politics of
the Machiavellian concept of ridurre ai principii—the belief that the preservation of the
republic requires a periodic return to its founding principles and condition.” Id. at 340;
see also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864
(1989) (noting “that in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist”); SCALIA, supra
note 2, at 38 (“[T]he Great Divide with regard to constitutional interpretation is . . . that
between original meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current
meaning.”). “Traditionalism thus differs from originalism, which draws its normative
authority not from historical practice but from a social contract theory of precommitment
by the American people.” John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The NonRetrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1241 (1998).
Under a textualist approach, the “text is the law, and it is the text that must be
observed” through a reasonable construction “to contain all that it fairly means.”
SCALIA, supra note 2, at 22, 23. Where, and if, the language of a constitutional provision
provides the answer to the question being litigated, no extratextual analysis is required.
One commentator has observed that the “Constitution is phrased in such broad terms that
a judge who adheres simply to the text can do essentially anything he or she wants.”
David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1153, 1157 (1998). As we will see, Justice Scalia resorts to textualism in support of his
view that Brown and Loving were correctly decided. See infra notes 291–95, 301–05
and accompanying text.
Justice Scalia has employed traditionalist, originalist, and textualist methodologies in
his constitutional analysis. Noting that “these aspects of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence
are sometimes in tension” and that it may not be “possible to be entirely consistent,”
Michael McConnell has concluded that:
these various methods have something very important in common: they all
respect the will of the people, as expressed at various points in time. But by
failing to articulate the connection between these methods, or to explain how
to decide cases when they are in conflict, Justice Scalia leaves himself open to
the charge of inconsistency.
McConnell, supra note 8 at 1137 & n.45. The correctness of that charge is beyond the
scope of this Article; the point, for present purposes, is that the Justice’s traditionalism is
different from, and should not be confused with, originalism and textualism.
24. “The truth is that the tradition of racial oppression, including racial
segregation, has always enjoyed some form of state sanction . . . .” Robert L. Hayman,
Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 627, 674; see also
Judge Damon J. Keith, What Happens to a Dream Deferred: An Assessment of Civil
Rights Law Twenty Years After the 1963 March on Washington, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 469, 483 (1984) (“[T]here is another American ‘tradition’—one of slavery,
segregation, bigotry and injustice.” (quoting William T. Coleman, Jr., Equality—Not Yet,
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1981, at 15)).
25. The term “Jim Crow,” as a way of characterizing Black people, had its origins
in minstrelsy in the early nineteenth century. Thomas ‘Daddy’ Rice, a white
minstrel, popularized the term. Using burned cork to blacken his face, attired
in the ill-fitting, tattered garment of a beggar, and grinning broadly, Rice
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traditionalism in 1954 and 1967 would have required the Court to take
into account and to defer to then extant legal, political, and social
practices, leading to the conclusion that state sanctioned racial
segregation and miscegenation prohibitions were not unconstitutional.
This Article also questions whether Justice Scalia, in grounding his
analysis in text rather than tradition, has adjusted or distorted his
approach in a way that avoids the (for some uncomfortable, if not
unthinkable) conclusion that Brown and Loving were wrongly decided.26
To the extent that he has, the integrity of his proclaimed traditionalist
methodology is implicated.
II. BROWN AND LOVING
Some traditions favored by, and the entrenched beliefs of, a majority
of a society may be noxious and harmful to some members of the
community. Two such traditions, those of “race”27 and racism, have
imitated the dancing, singing, and demeanor generally ascribed to Negro
character. [Rice called the dance routine] “Jump Jim Crow” . . . . By the
1830s, minstrelsy had become one of the most popular forms of mass
entertainment, ‘Jim Crow’ had entered the American vocabulary, and many
whites . . . came away from minstrel shows with their distorted images of black
life, character, and aspirations reinforced. Less clear is how a dance . . .
became synonymous with a system designed by whites to segregate the races.
LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW, at
xiv (1998).
26. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 77 (1990) (“[A]ny theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of
psychological fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.”);
FALLON, supra note 23, at 56 (“[A] constitutional theory is widely thought to be
disqualified from acceptance if it could not justify the result in Brown.”); LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 23 (2000) (“[A]ll constitutional
commentators, whether on the left or the right, agree Brown was correctly decided, and
any theory to the contrary is impossible to sustain.”); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1881, 1930 (1995) (“[I]t is perfectly understandable, if unfortunate, that
conservatives have felt compelled to adjust/distort their constitutional theories to
accommodate Brown.”); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation
Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995) (commenting that constitutional theories not
leading to the result in Brown are “seriously discredited”); Richard A. Posner, Bork and
Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1990) (“No constitutional theory that implies
that Brown v. Board of Education . . . was decided incorrectly will receive a fair hearing
nowadays.”). But see John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1463 n.295 (1992) (“An interpretation of the Constitution is
not wrong because it would produce a different result in Brown.”).
27. While the word “race” is used herein for the sake of convenience, it should be
noted that the term is a sociopolitical and not a biological concept. See STEPHEN JAY
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prevailed in various forms and degrees throughout the history of the
United States.28 Those traditions have included the problem of the color
line separating Whites and Blacks and subordinating members of the
latter group;29 the view of Blacks as “the less than human negro”30 who,
in addition to being genetically and intellectually inferior to Whites,31
were “dull, tasteless, and anomalous” in imagination;32 the Constitution’s
protection of slavery and that document’s description of Blacks as “other
persons” and three-fifths of a human being;33 the Supreme Court’s early
view of Blacks as property and not constitutional citizens;34 the demise
of the post-Civil War Reconstruction and the rise of the racist
institutions of the Black Codes and Jim Crow;35 and other laws and
political, legal, and social institutions and norms that purposely placed
and kept many Blacks “in the lowest status, least remunerative jobs”36
and hampered the ability of many to accumulate wealth in the same
manner and quantity enjoyed by those not similarly subjected to such
discrimination.37
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 397–407 (rev. and expanded ed. 1996); GLENN C.
LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 65–67 (2002). For additional discussions
of the construct of race, see generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996); SCOTT L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE
AMERICAN MISADVENTURE OF RACE (2000); ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA’S “RACIAL” CRISIS (1997);
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in RaceConscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
28. See generally Norman Redlich, “Out, Damned Spot; Out, I Say”: The Persistence
of Race in American Law, 25 VT. L. REV. 475 (2001).
29. See W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK: ESSAYS AND
SKETCHES 13 (2d ed. 1903); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE COLOR LINE: LEGACY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at xiii–xiv (1993).
30. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Looking for God
and Racism in All the Wrong Places, 70 DENV. U. L. REV. 191, 193 (1993).
31. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLITICS: RACE AND THE
MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 48 (1997) (“[R]acist ideology . . . defined Black
people as biologically inferior and socially undesirable . . . .”).
32. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 139 (William Peden
ed., 1954). For a discussion of Jefferson’s views on Blacks, see DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
JOHN ADAMS 330–31 (2001); GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 218–28 (1978); and Herbert Hovenkamp, Social
Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 649–50.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 54 (1998).
34. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 481–82 (1857).
35. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION: 1863–1877 (1988); W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION:
AN ESSAY TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE PART WHICH BLACK FOLK PLAYED IN THE
ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: 1860–1880 (1935); C. VANN
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed. 1974).
36. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1073 (1991).
37. See generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK
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Included in this nation’s legal, political, economic, and societal traditions
are the traditions of racial segregation in public education38 and
prohibitions against interracial39 marriage and sexual relations. Both
traditions, and the Supreme Court’s treatment of them in 1954 and 1967,
respectively, are discussed in this Part.
A. Tradition, Segregation in Education, and the Constitution
This discussion of racial segregation begins with Plessy v. Ferguson.40
This well-known and apparently collusive case41 referred to tradition in
holding that the doctrine of separate-but-equal, as applied in the context
of a Louisiana statute requiring segregation in public transportation, did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Justice Brown’s opinion for the Court, over the lone dissent of Justice
Harlan,43 noted that laws permitting or requiring the separation of Blacks
WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995).
38. On the tradition and history of segregation in public school education, see
generally PETER IRONS, JIM CROW’S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN
DECISION 1–42 (2002).
39. Although the word “interracial” is used in this Article, it should be noted that
use of the term is subject to the objection that “it implies fixed categories of race and
therefore an overly natural quality to those categories.” MARTHA HODES, WHITE
WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 9 (1997).
40. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See generally CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
INTERPRETATION (1987); Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303;
Earl M. Maltz, “Separate but Equal” and the Law of Common Carriers in the Era of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 553 (1986).
41. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 73 (1975). The argument
in Plessy that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited separate-but-equal railroad
accommodations was “suggested by the railroad in a contrived case as a last resort to
strike down a statute that was making it very expensive to run a railroad.” Hovenkamp,
supra note 32, at 647.
42. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51. The Court also concluded that the state law did
not violate the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery or involuntary servitude. See id.
at 543 (“A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and
colored races . . . has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or
reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
43. Harlan’s dissent is well known for its statement that “there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is
color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” Plessy, 163 U.S. at
559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Often omitted in discussions of Justice Harlan’s colorblind
statement is this passage from that opinion:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I
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and Whites “have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their
police power.”44 Pointing to the establishment of separate schools for
Black and White children, Justice Brown opined that this form of
segregation had “been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power
even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race
have been longest and most earnestly enforced.”45 Similar laws enacted
by Congress and a number of states had been sustained by the courts, he
continued, as had “universally recognized” laws forbidding interracial
marriages.46
Of significance to this Article is the Plessy Court’s view that the
Louisiana statute was a reasonable regulation, with reasonableness
determined “with reference to the established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of their
comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good order.”47
Employing these criteria, the Court concluded that it could not
say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races
in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth
Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools for colored
children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which does not
seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state legislatures.48

The question of the constitutionality of segregation in another context,
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.
Id. For discussions of this aspect of Harlan’s dissent, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy
Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV. 151, 172 (1996) (arguing
that while Harlan “believed the Fourteenth Amendment rendered African Americans
‘our equals before the law’ . . . [i]t is not so clear that Harlan thought African Americans
were the moral equals of the majority race”); Molly Townes O’Brien, Justice John
Marshall Harlan As Prophet: The Plessy Dissenter’s Color-Blind Constitution, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 753, 761 (1998) (“For Harlan, however, social and economic
inequality was simply part of the natural order of things, a result of the superiority of
white civilization.”).
44. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 545. Legal bans on interracial marriages had also been noted in Chief
Justice Roger Taney’s opinion for the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1857). In Taney’s view, antimiscegenation laws evidenced a
perpetual and impassable barrier erected between the white race and the one
which [Whites] had reduced to slavery . . . and which they looked upon as so
far below them in the scale of created beings that intermarriages between white
persons and negroes and mulattoes were regarded as unnatural and immoral,
and punished as crimes.
Id. at 409.
47. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
48. Id. at 550–51; see also FALLON, supra note 23, at 57 (noting that “in the wake
of Plessy, legally mandated race-based segregation had suffused the social and political
fabric of many states, especially in the South”).
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that of public education, was considered and answered by the Court in
post-Plessy cases wherein the Court held that a school board’s decision
to fund a high school for White children and not fund a separate school
for Black children was not unconstitutional49 and that the constitutional
rights of a Chinese-American citizen were not infringed when a
Mississippi school district excluded her from attending because she was
not White.50 Later cases dealing with the segregation issue in the
professional school setting held that the states had failed to meet their
duty to afford separate-but-equal educational opportunities to Blacks,51
but did so without overruling Plessy.52 The question whether Plessy
should be overruled was before the Court in the Segregation Cases
involving challenges to public school racial segregation in Kansas, South
Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.53 Brown v. Board of Education,54
decided by a three-judge panel, rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that a
Kansas statute authorizing the maintenance of separate schools for Black
and White children in grades below high school was unconstitutional.55
Segregation itself, if “equal,” did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
the court stated, citing Plessy and noting that the Supreme Court had
refused to overrule Plessy on numerous occasions.56

49. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
50. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927).
51. See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352
(1938); see also McKissick v. Carmichael, 187 F.2d 949, 954 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding
that a state established law school for Blacks was inferior to the University of North
Carolina School of Law and ordering the admission of Black applicants).
52. See, e.g., Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636.
53. Another case challenged school segregation in the District of Columbia. In
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’
compliant alleging that the segregation of Black children deprived them of due process
of law under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 498. (Unlike the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause. Id. at 498–99.) The Supreme Court, noting
its prohibition of segregation under the Equal Protection Clause in Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), concluded that “it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.” Bolling, 347 U.S.
at 500 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the Court held that “racial segregation in the
public schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.” Id.
54. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev’d, 347 U.S. 483 (1955).
55. Id. at 797, 800.
56. Id. at 798–99.
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The South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott,57 refused to hold that the
segregation of the races in public schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Concluding that it was bound by Plessy,58 the court stated: “We
think . . . that segregation . . . , so long as equality of rights is preserved,
is a matter of legislative policy for the several states, with which the
federal courts are powerless to interfere.”59 In an explicitly traditionalist
passage, the court stated that:
[W]hen seventeen states and the Congress of the United States have for more
than three-quarters of a century required segregation of the races in the public
schools, and when this has received the approval of the leading appellate courts
of the country including the unanimous approval of the Supreme Court of the
United States at a time when that court included Chief Justice Taft and Justices
Stone, Holmes and Brandeis, it is a late day to say that such segregation is
violative of fundamental constitutional rights. It is hardly reasonable to suppose
that legislative bodies over so wide a territory, including the Congress of the
United States, and great judges of high courts have knowingly defied the
Constitution for so long a period or that they have acted in ignorance of the
meaning of its provisions. The constitutional principle is the same now that it
has been throughout this period; and if conditions have changed so that
segregation is no longer wise, this is a matter for the legislatures and not for the
courts. The members of the judiciary have no more right to read their ideas of
sociology into the Constitution than their ideas of economics.60

Davis v. County School Board61 concluded that a Virginia constitutional
provision mandating separate schools for Black and White children was
a constitutional exercise of the state’s police power and would be upheld
as a reasonable and uniform regulation. Segregation was “ingrained and

57. 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), rev’d sub nom., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
58. Id. at 537. The court distinguished the issue of segregation in graduate and
professional schools from the issue of segregation in lower grades in public schools. Id.
at 535.
59. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 532. Opining that state self-determination and local
customs should be free from federal regulation, the court stated:
One of the great virtues of our constitutional system is that, while the
federal government protects the fundamental rights of the individual, it leaves
to the several states the solutions of local problems. In a country with a great
expanse of territory with peoples of widely differing customs and ideas, local
self government in local matters is essential to the peace and happiness of the
people in the several communities as well as to the strength and unity of the
country as a whole. It is universally held, therefore, that each state shall
determine for itself, subject to the observance of the fundamental rights and
liberties guaranteed by the federal Constitution, how it shall exercise the police
power, i. e., the power to legislate with respect to the safety, morals, health and
general welfare. And in no field is this right of the several states more clearly
recognized than in that of public education.
Id.
60. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
61. 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev’d sub nom., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955).
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wrought in the texture” of Virginia life,62 had “an unbroken usage in
Virginia for more than eighty years,”63 and
rests neither upon prejudice, nor caprice, nor upon any other measureless
foundation. Rather the proof is that it declares one of the ways of life in
Virginia. Separation of white and colored “children” in the public schools of
Virginia has for generations been a part of the mores of her people. To have
separate schools has been their use and wont.64

In the fourth case, Belton v. Gebhart,65 the Delaware court concluded
that Black schools were inferior to White schools in the training of
teachers, student-teacher ratio, physical plant, and other matters and
ordered the admission of Black students to previously White-only
schools. The court also found that “[s]tate-imposed segregation in
education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving
educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those
available to white children otherwise similarly situated.”66 Notwithstanding
that finding, the court considered itself bound by the Supreme Court’s
view that segregation below the college level was not unconstitutional.
The “‘separate but equal doctrine’ in education should be rejected,” the
court stated, “but . . . its rejection must come from” the Supreme Court’s
reexamination of Plessy.67
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court granted review of the
aforementioned decisions.68 Traditionalist arguments were prominent as
the states asked the Court to apply and adhere to Plessy. For example,
the brief of the Topeka, Kansas, board of education in the Brown case
relied on Plessy’s statement that laws permitting and requiring
segregation “have been generally, if not universally, recognized as
within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their
62. Id. at 340.
63. Id. at 339.
64. Id.
65. 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952), aff’d, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. 1952), aff’d sub nom.,
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. Id. at 865.
67. Id.
68. See Gebhart v. Belton, 344 U.S. 891 (1952) (granting certiorari for the
Delaware case). The Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education; the South Carolina
case, Briggs v. Elliott; and the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, each came
to the Supreme Court under a direct right of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. In Brown v.
Board of Education, 344 U.S. 1 (1952), the Court noted probable jurisdiction in the
Virginia case and further held that the Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia cases would
be heard together.
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police power” and have “been held to be a valid exercise of the
legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of
the colored race have been the longest and most earnestly enforced.”69
In his December 1952 oral argument before the Court, the school
board’s counsel, Paul E. Wilson, urged that a ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs
will necessarily overrule the doctrines expressed in [Plessy and Gong Lum] and,
at the same time, will say that the legislatures of the seventeen or twenty-one
states, that the Congress of the United States, that dozens of appellate courts
have been wrong for a period of more than seventy-five years, when they have
believed and have manifested a belief that facilities equal though separate were
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.70

Justice Burton asked if Wilson recognized “that within seventy-five
years the social and economic conditions and the personal relations of
the nation may have changed, so that what may have been a valid
interpretation of them seventy-five years ago would not be a valid
interpretation of them constitutionally today?”71 Wilson responded:
“We recognize that as a possibility. We do not believe that this record
discloses any such change.”72
Arguing for the school district in the Briggs litigation, John W. Davis
referred to the “condition of those who framed” the Fourteenth
Amendment:
The resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment was proffered by
Congress in June 1866. In the succeeding month of July, the same Congress
proceeded to establish or to continue separate schools in the District of
Columbia, and from that good day to this Congress has not waivered [sic] in

69. Brief for Appellees at 22–23, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951) (No. 8), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89–90 (Philip B. Kurland &
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554 (1896))
[hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS].
70. Oral Argument Dec. 9, 1952, at 24, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797
(D. Kan. 1951) (No. 8), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note
69, at 301. During the argument, Justice Frankfurter commented that the state legislation
and “a long course of utterances by this Court and other courts in dealing with the
subject, from the point of view of relevance as to whether a thing is or is not within the
prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment, is from my point of view almost as
impressive as a single decision, which does not mean that I would be controlled in a
constitutional case by a direct adjudication.” Id. at 12, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at 289. In his view, the court had “to face in
this case the fact that we are dealing with a long-established historical practice by the
states, and the assumption of the exercise of power which not only was written on the
statute books, but has been confirmed by state courts, as well as by expressions of this
Court.” Id.
71. Id. at 24, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 301.
72. Id.
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that policy. It has confronted the attack upon it repeatedly. During the life of
Charles Sumner, over and over again, he undertook to amend the law of the
District so as to provide for mixed and not for separate schools, and again and
again he was defeated.73

Davis also made a count-the-states argument in support of segregation:
What did the states think about this at the time of the ratification? At the time
the Amendment was submitted, there were 37 states in the Union. Thirty of
them had ratified the Amendment at the time it was proclaimed in 1868. Of
those thirty ratifying states, 23 either then had, or immediately installed,
separate schools for white and colored children under their public school
systems. Were they violating the Amendment which they had solemnly
accepted? Were they conceiving of it in any other sense than that it did not
touch their power over their public schools?74

Davis further noted that, as of 1952, seventeen states provided for
racially segregated schools, with four others permitting segregation “so
that you have 21 states today which conceive it their power and right to
maintain separate schools if it suits their policy.”75
The oral argument in the Davis case similarly referenced tradition. J.
Lindsay Almond, arguing for the defendant, expressed his concern about
the impact of a decision that would strike down, contrary to the customs, the
traditions and the mores of what we might claim to be a great people,
established through generations, who themselves are fiercely and irrevocably
dedicated to the preservation of the white and colored races. . . .
....
. . . [O]ur people, deeply ingrained within them, feel that it is their custom, their
use and their wont; and their traditions, if destroyed, as this record shows, will
make it impossible to raise public funds through the process of taxation, either
at the state or the local level, to support the public school system of Virginia,
and it would destroy the public school system of Virginia as we know it today.
That is not an idle threat.76

After discussing the cases in conference in December 1952,77 the
73. Oral Argument Dec. 10, 1952, at 2–3, Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951) (No. 101), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra
note 69, at 331–32.
74. Id. at 4, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at
333.
75. Id. at 4–5, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 333–34.
76. Oral Argument Dec. 10, 1952, at 36–37, Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F.
Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (No. 191), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at 383–84.
77. In a 1952 conference memorandum to Justice Jackson entitled, “A Random
Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Justice Jackson’s clerk (and current Chief Justice)
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Supreme Court, fearing and seeking to postpone what may have been a
split decision,78 ordered reargument and asked the parties to submit
additional briefs on five specific questions, the first of which asked the
following: “What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and
the State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did not
understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?”79 Prior
to the reargument, Chief Justice Vinson suffered a fatal heart attack,80 and
President Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren as the Court’s Chief Justice.81
The plaintiffs’ brief on reargument called for the overruling of Plessy.
[T]he very purpose [of the Civil War Amendments] was to effectuate a
complete break with governmental action based on the established usages,
customs and traditions of the slave era, to revolutionize the legal relationship
between Negroes and whites, to destroy the inferior status of the Negro and to
place him upon a plane of complete equality with the white man.82

In their view, Plessy gutted the Fourteenth Amendment.

William H. Rehnquist wrote: “I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian
position, for which I have been excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagues, but I think Plessy v.
Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed. If the Fourteenth Amendment did not
enact Spencer’s Social Statics, it just as surely did not enact Myrdahl’s American
Dilemma.” 117 CONG. REC. S44,880 (1971) (quoting memorandum). According to
Chief Justice Rehnquist, this memorandum set forth Justice Jackson’s views and not his
own. The veracity of that statement has been the subject of much debate. See JOHN W.
DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT
REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 274–84 (2001); KLUGER, supra note 41, at 605–09.
78. According to one account, four Justices—Black, Douglas, Burton, and
Minton—indicated in conference that they would vote to end public school segregation,
with Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Reed suggesting that they would vote to affirm
Plessy. The remaining Justices—Frankfurter, Jackson, and Clark—were ambivalent.
See KLUGER, supra note 41, at 613; see also POWE, supra note 26, at 23 (“The reason for
reargument was that the Court, after the initial argument, was badly split.”); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHY 72, 77–78 (1983) (describing how Justice Frankfurter’s fear of a split Court
led him to seek reargument on additional questions posed by the Court). For a differing
view of the December 1952 conference and the positions of the Justices, see MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961, at 194 (1994).
79. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953) (mem.). This question was based
on a partially erroneous premise, as no state conventions were held to consider
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See KLUGER, supra note 41, at 615 n*.
80. Remarking on Chief Justice Vinson’s death, Justice Frankfurter stated, “This is the
first indication that I have ever had that there is a God.” SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 72.
81. Prior to the Court’s decision in Brown, President Eisenhower, referring to
Southerners, said to Chief Justice Warren: “These are not bad people. All they are
concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not required to sit in school
alongside some big overgrown Negroes.” ROBERT A. CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE 778
(2002).
82. Brief for Appellants at 42, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951
(No. 8), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at 555.
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When the Court employed the old usages, customs and traditions as the basis for
determining the reasonableness of segregation statutes designed to resubjugate
the Negro to an inferior status, it nullified the acknowledged intention of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and made a travesty of the equal
protection clause.83

If traditions, customs, and usages were the touchstones, “ours indeed
would become a stagnant society. Even if there be some situations in
which custom, usage, and tradition may be considered in testing the
reasonableness of governmental action, customs, traditions, and usages
rooted in slavery cannot be worthy of the constitutional sanction of this
Court.”84
In its brief, the State of Kansas argued that it was a “fact of history that
racial segregation in the public schools was an established pattern in a
majority of the states when the amendment was adopted.”85 In an appendix
to its brief, the State listed twenty-four states in which “segregation
existed with legislative or constitutional sanction contemporaneous with
and/or subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,” ten
states with laws authorizing or requiring segregation enacted by the same
legislatures ratifying the amendment, and thirteen states where segregation
had not been authorized.86
During the December 1953 oral reargument, John W. Davis, counsel
for the school district in Briggs, contended that: “the Congress which
submitted, and the state legislatures which ratified, the Fourteenth
Amendment did not contemplate and did not understand that it would
abolish segregation in public schools.”87 In his view, “the intent of
Congress was clear not to enter this field. We say the intent of the
ratifying states was equally clear, the majority of them, not to enter this
field.”88 T. Justin Moore, representing Prince Edward County, emphasized
that in twenty-three states the “same legislature that adopted the
83. Id. at 43, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 556.
84. Id.
85. Brief for the State of Kansas on Reargument at 52, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98
F. Supp 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (No. 8), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at 811.
86. Id. at 91, reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 847.
87. Oral Reargument Dec. 7, 1953, at 33, Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529
(E.D.S.C. 1951) (No. 101), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra
note 69, at 481.
88. Id. at 35, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 483.
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Fourteenth Amendment passed . . . laws that required segregation”89 and
that seven other states allowed pre-existing segregation to continue even
after the Fourteenth Amendment went into effect.90 Moore continued:
“The record is perfectly clear. And how these gentlemen [the plaintiffs’
attorneys] try to explain away that record with respect to those states is
beyond our understanding.”91 The Court was faced with deciding between
the States’ arguments grounded in traditional views of the constitutionality
of state-sanctioned segregation and the rejection of such views under an
approach recognizing changed circumstances during the post-Plessy
period and contemporary dynamics of and views on segregation.
In its unanimous ruling issued on May 17, 1954, the Court noted that
the reargument of the case “was largely devoted to the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868” and
covered congressional consideration of the Amendment, state
ratifications, “then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views
of proponents and opponents of the Amendment.”92 The Court was
convinced “that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough
to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive.”93
Turning to Plessy and its prior decisions involving the separate-butequal doctrine, the Court stated that: “[i]n none of these cases was it
necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro
plaintiff.”94 The Court also noted that its previous decision, Sweatt v.
Painter, reserved decision on the issue of the applicability of Plessy to
public education.95 That issue was now before the Court. “Our decision,
therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors
in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must
look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.”96
The Court then said that:
we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or
even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American
89. Oral Reargument Dec. 8, 1953, at 5, Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp.
337 (E.D. Va. 1952) (No. 191), reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS,
supra note 69, at 506.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 6, reprinted in 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 507.
92. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954).
93. Id. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (discussing the Court’s treatment of
the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment).
94. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
95. Id.; see supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
96. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation
in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.97

Having adopted a contemporary, as opposed to a backward looking,
approach to the issue, the Court declared that “education is perhaps the
most important function of state and local governments” and “is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally
to his environment.”98 When a state provides public education, it provides
“a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”99
The Court concluded that race-based segregation of children in the
public schools deprived them of equal educational opportunities, even
where physical facilities and other tangible factors were equal.100 In
support of this conclusion, the Court quoted a finding of the lower court
in the Kansas litigation:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system.101

The Court agreed with the Kansas court’s finding: “Whatever may
have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”102
The Court thus concluded that:
in the field of public education the doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that
the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.103

97. Id. at 492–93 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 493.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 494 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
102. Id. at 494–95 (footnote omitted). The Court’s reference to modern authority
was supported by the infamous footnote eleven, a note containing citations to sociological
works by Kenneth Clark, Gunnar Myrdal, and others. See id. at 494–95 n.11.
103. Id. at 495. On the same day that it decided Brown, the Court held that school
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Brown is one of the seminal decisions of the Supreme Court. While
the Court’s ruling did not itself undo segregation104 and may well have
increased White southerners’ resistance to school desegregation,105 the
Court did put in place an equality principle that was invoked in later
cases holding that segregation in other contexts was unconstitutional.106
Brown broke with and ruled in the face of, and in spite of, entrenched
discriminatory traditions grounded in longstanding readings and
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted by Jack M.
Balkin, “the Court held unconstitutional well-settled and longestablished practices of many different states and thousands of localities.
It struck down precedents that had stood for well over half a century, all
in the name of higher constitutional values.”107 Balkin went on:
Brown’s rejection of laws enforcing segregation symbolized to many that democracy
meant more than majority rule. The New Deal dictum that courts should defer to the
considered judgments of democratically elected majorities rang particularly hollow
when the laws in question were the results of centuries of racial prejudice, and when
blacks as a group were effectively denied the right to vote throughout much of the
South. The country’s democratic ideals required more than formal majority rule:
they also required enforceable guarantees of equality, fundamental rights, and legal
safeguards for minorities. Thus, Brown stood as the key precedent for a responsible
form of judicial activism . . . [,] an enlightened judicial activism that protected
fundamental rights and minority interests from the tyranny of majorities.108

One measure of Brown’s break with traditional views concerning the
legality of segregation is the reaction to the Court’s decision. May 17,
1954, the day of the issuance of the Court’s ruling, was “Black Monday”
for many segregationists.109 Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia called
Brown “the most serious blow that has yet been struck against the rights
segregation in the District of Columbia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954); see supra note 53.
104. It has been argued that desegregation efforts were more effectively addressed
and implemented by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 55–57 (1991).
105. Cf. id. at 127 (discussing polls charting a decline in Southerners’ support for
desegregation in the years after Brown, but concluding that there is scant evidence that
Brown affected attitudes about school desegregation in the South).
106. See Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (public buildings); Watson v.
City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 529 (1963) (public parks and other recreational
facilities); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724–26 (1961) (eating
places); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(park facilities); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (transportation).
107. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 3, 15 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
108. Id. at 15–16.
109. See TOM P. BRADY, BLACK MONDAY (1955). As noted by Randall Kennedy,
Brady’s book “asserted that the attack on racial segregation in the public schools was
aimed not at attaining equity in education but rather at fostering racial amalgamation.”
KENNEDY, supra note 21, at 24.
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of the states in a matter vitally affecting their authority and welfare.”110
Mississippi Senator James Eastland announced that the South “will not
abide by or obey this legislative decision by a political court.”111 James
J. Kilpatrick, editor of the Richmond News Leader, wrote editorials
calling for a resurrection of the doctrine of interposition, a theory
positing that Supreme Court decisions were not valid if objected to by
the states.112 A poll taken in the aftermath of Brown revealed that eighty
percent of southern Whites opposed school desegregation, and the
Louisiana Legislature went so far as to censure the Court for its
opinion.113
Thereafter, in 1955, the Court remanded the Segregation Cases to the
lower courts for further proceedings and the issuance of decrees “as are
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these
cases.”114 In response to the Brown decision, more than ninety percent
of southern United States Representatives and Senators signed a
Declaration of Constitutional Principles, also known as the “Southern
Manifesto,” drafted by United States Senators Strom Thurmond, Sam
Ervin, Harry Byrd, Richard Russell, and others.115 That document
110. KLUGER, supra note 41, at 710; see also POWE, supra note 26, at 38.
111. KLUGER, supra note 41, at 710–11. Georgia governor Herman Talmadge
stated that, after Brown, the Constitution was “a mere scrap of paper.” Id. at 710.
Newspaper columnist James Reston complained that the Court’s decision rejected
“history, philosophy and custom” and “read more like an expert paper on sociology than
a Supreme Court decision.” Id. at 711.
112. POWE, supra note 26, at 58; see also DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE:
GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 86 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the view that
“states had the constitutional authority to ‘interpose’ themselves between the federal
government and its citizens—a doctrine that sounded remarkably like the one sketched
out by John C. Calhoun in the 1830s and 1840s”); Anne S. Emanuel, Turning the Tide in
the Civil Rights Revolution: Elbert Tuttle and the Desegregation of the University of
Georgia, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 9 n.30 (1999) (“[I]nterposition was a completely
discredited theory that each state could interpose it’s [sic] own sovereignty between the
national government and the people of the state.”); Carl Tobias, Public School
Desegregation in Virginia During the Post-Brown Decade, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1261, 1269 (1996) (discussing the Virginia Assembly’s announcement of its “firm
intention to take all appropriate measures honorably, legally and constitutionally
available . . . [in order] to resist [Brown’s] illegal encroachment upon [Virginia’s]
sovereign powers” (quoting S.J. Res. 3, 1956 Va. Acts 1213) (alterations in original))).
113. POWE, supra note 26, at 39; STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM,
AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 103 (1997).
114. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
115. See CARO, supra note 81, at 785; CARTER, supra note 112, at 86; DAVID R.
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rejected Brown as an exercise of unlawful “naked power,”116 “reaffirmed
reliance on the Constitution,” and “pledged to use all lawful means to
bring about a reversal of this decision which is contrary to the
Constitution.”117
B. Tradition, Antimiscegenation, and the Constitution
Like the entrenched practice of segregation in public education,
related concerns about sex between Blacks and Whites—more
specifically, between Black men and White women118—was “a historical
development that evolved out of particular social, political, and
economic circumstances.”119 White supremacy—premised on a notion
GOLDFIELD, BLACK, WHITE, AND SOUTHERN: RACE RELATIONS AND SOUTHERN CULTURE,
1940 TO THE PRESENT 84 (1990); POWE, supra note 26, at 61. House Speaker Sam
Rayburn and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson were not asked to and did not sign
the Manifesto. Senators Albert Gore and Estes Kefauver of Tennessee did not sign.
Twenty-three additional Southern members of the House of Representatives,
representing Texas, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Florida, also did not sign. Two of
the three nonsigners from North Carolina were defeated in the following Democratic
primary. See POWE, supra note 26, at 61–62.
116. ROSENBERG, supra note 104, at 78; see also GOLDFIELD, supra note 115, at 84–86.
117. POWE, supra note 26, at 61 (quoting Declaration of Constitutional Principles,
102 CONG. REC. 4515–16 (1956)).
118. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 159
(1996) (“[B]lack male-white female was the paradigmatic act that the miscegenation
taboo prohibited.”).
119. HODES, supra note 39, at 1. Some were concerned that desegregation in public
education would lead to miscegenation.
The fear of “mongrelization” permeated white southern thought; it was
assumed that if white and African-American children went to school together,
they would grow to like each other, date each other, and ultimately some
would marry each other. Look magazine editor William Attwood wrote that
the southerner “will tell you that, sooner or later, some Negro boy will be
walking his daughter home from school, staying for supper, taking her to the
movies . . . and then your Southern friend asks you the inevitable, clinching,
question: “Would you want your daughter to marry a Nigra?” Attwood’s
hypothetical southern friend was hardly hypothetical; in the first national poll
on interracial marriage, a bare 4 percent of white respondents said they
approved.
POWE, supra note 26, at 69 (footnote omitted); see id. at 36 (reporting that President
Eisenhower told Chief Justice Warren that southerners were concerned that their “sweet
little girls [would] be seated alongside some big black bucks” in schools); see also Berea
College v. Commonwealth, 94 S.W. 623, 628 (Ky. 1906) (“From social amalgamation it
is but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage.”), aff’d, 211 U.S. 45
(1908); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 50
(1998) (“It had long been feared that school desegregation would bring to the surface all
the repressed terrors associated with the specter of interracial sex, a specter that had
always played a major part in American race relations.”); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY, at xix
(2001) (quoting the organizer of the National Association for the Advancement of White
People: “My daughters will never attend a school with Negroes so long as there is breath
in my body and gunpowder will burn.”).
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of “the purity of the southern woman, the purity of white blood, the
purity of the South itself”120—was constructed and policed by the
enslavement of Blacks, with the bright and dividing line between, on one
side, Black slavery and subordination and, on the other side, White
freedom and the establishment of social, political, and economic
boundaries maintaining a racial hierarchy.121 Black persons crossing
that line faced retaliatory violence, including lynchings and murder.122
For those concerned about a blurring or melding of Black and White and
a concomitant diminution of White supremacy and White civilization123
(especially in the post-Civil War world),124 the “taboo of sex between
black men and white women” and the fear of the “loss of control over
sex between blacks and whites” were matters of great importance.125
Because miscegenation “called into question the distinctive and superior
status of being white,” it “became the central symbol of the necessity of
racial segregation.”126
Laws prohibiting miscegenation were upheld in a number of early state
court decisions. The Georgia Supreme Court opined in one case that:
[t]he amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive
of deplorable results. Our daily observation shows us, that the offspring of
these unnatural connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that they
are inferior in physical development and strength, to the full-blood of either
race.127

The Missouri Supreme Court noted the “well authenticated fact” that an
120. POWE, supra note 26, at 69.
121. See HODES, supra note 39, at 147.
122. See RALPH GINZBURG, 100 YEARS OF LYNCHINGS 36, 69, 95, 156, 159, 217,
240 (1988); STEPHEN J. WHITFEILD, A DEATH IN THE DELTA: THE STORY OF EMMETT TILL
130 (1988); Ronald Turner, Remembering Emmett Till, 38 HOW. L.J. 411, 420 (1995).
123. See TUKUFU ZUBERI, THICKER THAN BLOOD: HOW RACIAL STATISTICS LIE 61
(2001) (“Miscegenation, or race mixing, was thought to be a degenerative act resulting in
the undermining of ‘white’ civilization.”).
124. With the end of formal slavery, “it was the newfound autonomy of the men
among the former slaves that carried the gravest danger, especially in the eyes of white
patriarchs.” HODES, supra note 39, at 147. Freed Black slaves seeking to create and
enforce property and inheritance rights from White fathers could not be and was not
countenanced. See LINDA WILLIAMS, PLAYING THE RACE CARD: MELODRAMAS OF BLACK
AND WHITE FROM UNCLE TOM TO O.J. SIMPSON 181–82 (2001). See generally Adrienne
D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 221 (1999).
125. HODES, supra note 39, at 147.
126. KOPPELMAN, supra note 118, at 159.
127. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869); accord Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483,
484 (Okla. 1924).
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interracial couple could not have any progeny, a fact justifying “those
laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and whites, laying out of
view other sufficient grounds for such enactments.”128 And a 1921
decision by the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that antimiscegenation
statutes “have been universally upheld as a proper exercise of the power
of each state to control its own citizens.”129
The United States Supreme Court, in Pace v. Alabama,130 rejected an
equal protection challenge to a state law providing for incarceration for
two to seven years as a penalty for interracial adultery or fornication and
a maximum of two years imprisonment for the same conduct between
persons of the same race. Justice Field, writing for the Court, reasoned
that interracial adultery
cannot be committed without involving the persons of both races in the same
punishment. Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed . . .
is directed against the offence designated and not against the person of any
particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether
white or black, is the same.131

And thirteen years later, in Plessy v. Ferguson,132 the Court referred to
the “universally recognized laws” forbidding interracial marriages in the
course of its decision upholding a separate-but-equal law applied to
public transportation.133
Running against the tide of decisions sanctioning antimiscegenation
measures was the California Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Perez v.
Lippold.134 Invalidating California’s prohibition of interracial marriages,135
the court rejected arguments that antimiscegenation laws were justified
because they prevented the contamination of the White race by those

128. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 179 (1883).
129. In re Paquet’s Estate, 200 P. 911, 913 (Or. 1921).
130. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
131. Id. at 585; see also Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954)
(holding that the law prohibiting Blacks and Whites from marrying or living together did
not violate the Constitution), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954); LANI GUINIER & GERALD
TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING
DEMOCRACY 35 (2002) (describing the use of formal neutrality by supporters of
antimiscegenation laws who argued “that the law was constitutional because it prohibited
whites from marrying blacks in the same way that it prohibited blacks from marrying
whites”).
132. 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see discussion supra notes 40–48 and accompanying
text.
133. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.
134. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
135. The California law provided: “All marriages of white persons with negroes,
Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal and void,” and no
marriage license “may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person with a
Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race.” Id. at 18.
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who were physically and mentally inferior to Whites136 and stated that
persons wishing to intermarry came from the “dregs of society” and their
offspring would burden the community,137 that such laws diminish racial
tensions and prevent the birth of children who may become social
problems,138 and that “Negroes are socially inferior and have so been
judicially recognized.”139
Seven years after the decision in Perez, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia considered the constitutionality of that state’s antimiscegenation
law in Naim v. Naim.140 Ruby Elaine Naim, who was White, sought a
divorce on the ground of adultery from her husband, Ham Say Naim,
who was Chinese.141 The trial judge did not rule on the divorce action;
instead, he granted the wife an annulment under Virginia’s Act to
Preserve Racial Integrity.142 That annulment exposed Mr. Naim to
deportation because he would not be validly married to a United States
citizen.143 The state high court, affirming the annulment and voiding the
136. Id. at 23–24.
137. Id. at 25.
138. Id. at 25–26.
139. Id. at 26. Dissenting, Justice Shenk argued that antimiscegenation laws “have
been in effect in this country since before our national independence and in this state
since our first legislative session. They have never been declared unconstitutional by
any court in the land although frequently they have been under attack.” Id. at 35 (Shenk,
J., dissenting). Counting the states, Justice Shenk wrote that California and twenty-nine
other states had antimiscegenation laws, with six of those states prohibiting such
marriages by constitutional provisions and several states refusing to recognize such
marriages even if they were valid in the state in which they were performed. Id. at 38.
After citing and discussing scholarly and scientific works on the adverse effects of
miscegenation, id. at 44–45, Justice Shenk argued that “under our tripartite system of
government this court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature as to the
necessity for the enactment where it was, as here, based upon existing conditions and
scientific data and belief.” Id. at 46.
140. 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per
curiam), aff’d, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per
curiam). For a discussion of the history of Virginia’s antimiscegenation laws, see A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 19–60 (1978). See generally Peter Wallenstein, Race,
Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s–1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 371 (1994).
141. See Gregory Michael Dorr, Principled Expediency: Eugenics, Naim v. Naim,
and the Supreme Court, 42 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 119 (1998).
142. See id. Section 20-54 of the Virginia Code provided that it was “unlawful for
any white person . . . to marry any save a white person, or a person with no other
admixture of blood than white and American Indian.” See Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 750
(quoting VA. CODE § 20-54 (1950)).
143. See POWE, supra note 26, at 71.

309

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

marriage, noted two of its prior decisions in which it said that “the
preservation of racial integrity is the unquestioned policy of this state,
and that it is sound and wholesome, cannot be gainsaid.”144 In addition,
the court quoted from a section on miscegenation in an American
Jurisprudence volume,145 cited multiple decisions from states upholding
intermarriage bans, and noted that “[m]ore than half of the States of the
Union have miscegenation statutes. With only one exception they have
been upheld in an unbroken line of decisions in every State in which it
has been charged that they violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”146 And,
the Naim court continued, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the United States
Supreme Court said that laws forbidding the intermarriage of the races
were universally recognized as within a state’s police power. State
regulation of marriage “may be maintained in accordance with
established tradition and culture and in furtherance of the physical,
moral and spiritual well-being of its citizens.”147
Naim came before the United States Supreme Court on the husband’s
appeal. Concerned about the enforcement of Brown, Justice Frankfurter
urged the Court to not take and decide the case. In his words: “The
moral considerations are, of course, those raised by the bearing of
adjudicating this question to the Court’s responsibility in not thwarting
or seriously handicapping the enforcement of its decision in the
segregation cases.”148 In November 1955 the Court issued a per curiam
decision stating that the “inadequacy of the record as to the relationship
of the parties” to Virginia and their return to that state, “and the failure
of the parties to bring here all questions relevant to the disposition of the
case, prevents the constitutional issue of the validity of the Virginia
statute on miscegenation . . . [from] being considered ‘in clean cut and
concrete form,’ unclouded by such problems.”149
On remand, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the
record before it and the trial court was adequate for resolution of the
issues on review and that its decree and the decree of the trial court were
“final so far as these courts are concerned.”150 Learning of that decision,
Chief Justice Warren remarked: “That’s what happens when you turn
your ass to the grandstand!”151 The United States Supreme Court again
144. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 752 (quoting Wood v. Commonwealth, 166 S.E. 477, 477
(Va. 1932)).
145. Id. at 753 (quoting 36 AM. JUR. Miscegenation § 3, at 452 (1941)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 756.
148. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 159.
149. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (quoting Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331
U.S. 549, 584 (1947).
150. Naim v. Naim, 90 S.E.2d 849, 850 (Va. 1956) (per curiam).
151. SCHWARTZ, supra note 78, at 162.
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refused to hear the case, ruling that the Virginia court’s decision “leaves
the case devoid of a properly presented federal question.”152 By refusing
to hear Naim’s appeal, the Court avoided addressing and deciding the
constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws.
The question ducked in Naim eventually came before the Court in
another Virginia case.153 In 1958, two residents of Caroline County,
Virginia—Richard Perry Loving, a White man, and Mildred Jeter, a
Black woman—left Virginia, were married in Washington, D.C., and
returned to Virginia to live as husband and wife. They were indicted and
convicted for violating Virginia’s antimiscegenation law and were
sentenced to one year in jail, with the sentences suspended so long as
they left the state and did not return for twenty-five years.154 The trial
judge left no doubt as to the purpose of the state law:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.155

The Lovings challenged their convictions, asserting that Virginia law
violated the federal and state constitutions and denied them due process
and equal protection of the laws.156 That challenge was rejected by the
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals; relying on Naim, that court rejected
the Lovings’ argument that Naim should be reversed because that
decision relied on Plessy, which had been reversed by Brown. Brown
did not invalidate antimiscegenation laws, the Virginia court concluded,
because six months after Brown, the Court denied certiorari in an
Alabama case upholding a ban on interracial marriages.157 The Virginia
court also noted that the Supreme Court did not rule on the
152.
153.
154.

Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See RACHEL MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE 95 (2001). As noted by Moran, “Caroline County had been called ‘the
passing capital of America’ because of the number of light-skinned blacks who were
taken for white.” Id. (footnote omitted).
155. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the trial court).
156. Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 80 (Va. 1966), rev’d, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
157. Id. at 81 (citing Jackson v. State, 72 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954), cert.
denied, 72 So. 2d 116 (Ala. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954)). It should be noted
that the Court’s denial of certiorari imparts no expression of the Court’s view of or
opinion on the merits of a case. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 289, 296 (1989);
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 365–66 n.1 (1973).
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constitutionality of antimiscegenation laws in its 1964 decision in
McLaughlin v. Florida.158
Moreover, the Virginia court was not persuaded by the Lovings’
references to “texts dealing with the sociological, biological and
anthropological aspects of the question of interracial marriages,” and
declined to engage in what it called “judicial legislation in the rawest
sense of that term.”159 “Such arguments are properly addressable to the
legislature, which enacted the law in the first place, and not to this court,
whose prescribed role in the separated powers of government is to
adjudicate, and not to legislate.”160 Finding no “sound judicial reason,
therefore, to depart from our holding in the Naim case,” the court
concluded: “Today, more than ten years since that decision was handed
down by this court, a number of states still have miscegenation statutes
and yet there has been no new decision reflecting adversely upon the
validity of such statutes.”161 Accordingly, the court held that the Virginia
law did not violate the United States or Virginia Constitutions.162
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the Virginia court’s
decision. In their brief to the Court, the Lovings argued that the “broad
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . were open-ended and
meant to be expounded in light of changing times and circumstances.”163
Responding to that argument, Virginia looked to the views of the state at
the time of the ratification of the Amendment:
If the intent of the State Legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment is deemed controlling, then surely the question of whether or not
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enactment of anti-miscegenation statutes by
the States must be decided contrary to the contention of appellants [the
Lovings], for those States which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
signified their intent by continuation of their anti-miscegenation laws
contemporaneously with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this
connection, a comparison of the States which retained their anti-miscegenation
laws as late as 1951 with the list of States which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment reveals that a majority of such States maintained their antimiscegenation laws in force after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.164

158. Loving, 147 S.E.2d at 81–82 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 195
(1964)). In McLaughlin, the Court held that a Florida law that applied only to and
mandated punishment for a White and Black couple who were unmarried and habitually
lived in and occupied the same room at night violated the Equal Protection Clause; the
Court expressed no views on the state’s law banning interracial marriages. McLaughlin,
379 U.S. at 195.
159. Loving, 147 S.E.2d at 82.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Brief for Appellants at 30, Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (No. 395)
(citations omitted), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at 778.
164. Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellee at 28, Loving v. Virginia, 147

312

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

[VOL. 40: 285, 2003]

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

Applying Scalian Traditionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Virginia further argued that Congress and federal and state courts
“clearly indicated that anti-miscegenation statutes of the various States are
not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.”165 According to Virginia,
the conflicting views of scientists on the wisdom of interracial marriages,
and the prevention thereof, made antimiscegenation a state law matter.
In such a situation, it is the exclusive province of the legislature of each State to
make the determination for its citizens as to the desirability, character and scope
of a policy of permitting or preventing such alliances—a province which the
judiciary may not, under well settled constitutional doctrine, invade.166

On April 10, 1967, the Supreme Court heard oral argument. Bernard
S. Cohen, counsel for the Lovings, was asked whether there had been
any legislative efforts to repeal the Virginia law. Remarking that no
such efforts had been made, Cohen explained that: “candidates who run
for office for the State Legislature have told me that they would, under
no circumstances, sacrifice their political lives by attempting to
introduce such a bill. . . . [M]ost of them have indicated that it would be
political suicide in Virginia.”167 With regard to the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Cohen averred that the Amendment “grows and
can be applied to situations as our knowledge becomes greater and as our
progress is made, and that there will be no problem in finding that this set
of statutes in Virginia are odious to the Fourteenth Amendment.”168
R.D. McIlwaine III, arguing on behalf of Virginia, asserted that the
Fourteenth Amendment “has no effect whatever upon the power of the
states to enact antimiscegenation laws . . . forbidding the intermarriage
of white and colored persons,” that the Court “is not authorized to
infringe the power of the State,” and that the Amendment “does not, read
in light of its history, touch, much less diminish, the power of the states
in this regard.”169 Alternatively, and assuming that the Amendment was
S.E.2d 78 (Va. 1966) (No. 395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS,
supra note 69, at 821.
165. Id. at 29, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 822.
166. Id. at 50, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 843.
167. Oral Argument Apr. 10, 1967, at 10, Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va.
1966) (No. 395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at
969.
168. Id. at 13, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 972.
169. Id. at 20, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 979.
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applicable, McIlwaine argued that Virginia’s law expressed a policy that
the state had a right to adopt and served “a legitimate legislative
objective of preventing the sociological and psychological evils which
attend interracial marriages.”170 Relying on the historical views of the
states, he said that:
we go fundamentally to the proposition that for over 100 years, since the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, numerous states—as late as 1956, the
majority of states—and now even 16 states, have been exercising this power
without any question being raised as to the authority of the state to exercise this
power.171

Antimiscegenation law and policy should be left to legislatures,
McIlwaine asserted. “Each individual state has the right to make this
determination for itself, because under the Fourteenth Amendment it was
intended to leave the problem here.”172 McIlwaine thought it “unlikely
that judges from all the states, and from both judiciaries, could have for
so long a period of time acted in disregard of the provisions of the
Constitution or in any ignorance of what its provisions were intended to
accomplish.”173
Issuing its decision in June 1967, the Supreme Court held that
Virginia’s law violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.174 Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for a unanimous Court
looked to the “central meaning of those constitutional commands.”175
Miscegenation “arose as an incident to slavery,” was “common in
Virginia since the colonial period,” and the Court noted that Virginia
was one of sixteen states that prohibited interracial marriages as of
1967.176 The law challenged by the Lovings “dates from the adoption of
the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period of extreme
nativism which followed the end of the First World War.”177 Describing
the state supreme court’s decision in Naim as “obviously an endorsement
of the doctrine of White Supremacy,”178 Chief Justice Warren rejected
an equal application construction of the Fourteenth Amendment179 and
170. Id.
171. Id. at 41, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 1000.
172. Id. at 42, reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69,
at 1001.
173. Id.
174. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 7.
179. The Court rejected Virginia’s argument that the state’s law did not invidiously
discriminate on the basis of race because Whites and Blacks in interracial marriages
were punished equally. Id. at 8–9. In the Court’s view, “the fact of equal application
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was not persuaded by the argument that statements made in the Thirtyninth Congress indicated that the framers of the Amendment had no
intention of invalidating antimiscegenation laws.180
The Court then reasoned that the “clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the States.”181 Virginia’s miscegenation
ban made race-based distinctions and prohibited “generally accepted
conduct if engaged in by members of different races.”182
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia
prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures
designed to maintain White Supremacy. . . . There can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.183

As for the Due Process Clause claim, the Court held that the Lovings
were deprived of liberty without due process of law. “The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”184 “Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”185
Loving’s rejection of Virginia’s tradition-based arguments in favor of
that state’s antimiscegenation laws made clear that state bans on
interracial marriages were unconstitutional and explicitly rejected the
maintenance of White supremacy as a permissible goal of the state.
Although some states resisted the Court’s decision in Loving, a number of
states implemented the Court’s ruling.186 “In fact, less than two months
after Loving, the first modern interracial union in Virginia occurred
without incident when a black man married a white woman in a Jehovah’s
does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the
Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to
race.” Id. at 9.
180. Relying on Brown, the Court stated “that although these historical sources ‘cast
some light’ they are not sufficient to resolve the problem” and were inconclusive. Id.
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)).
181. Id. at 10.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id. at 11–12 (footnote omitted).
184. Id. at 12.
185. Id.
186. See MORAN, supra note 154, at 101.
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Witness ceremony in Norfolk.”187 Whether this legal pronouncement of
the unconstitutionality of antimiscegenation laws changed public and
social attitudes is, however, a different question. Seventy-two percent of
respondents in a 1968 Gallup poll indicated that they tolerated, but did
not approve of, interracial marriages.188 A 1991 poll revealed that fortyfive percent of Whites disapproved of such marriages, with forty-four
percent approving.189 And, as we begin a new century, it is apparent that
race continues to be an important factor in the selection of marriage
partners.190
* * * * *
As discussed in this Part, both Brown and Loving can be seen as
breaks with traditional practices of segregation and antimiscegenation
laws, practices which the State defendants wished to continue free from
Court review and invalidation. If allowed to stand, the tradition
protective holdings made and reasoning offered by the lower courts
would have constitutionalized segregative state actions relegating Blacks
to race-based and race-defined places and spaces. With this backdrop in
mind, we now turn to and review Justice Scalia’s traditionalism.
III. JUSTICE SCALIA’S TRADITIONALISM
As previously noted, tradition has been referenced and used by

187. Id.
188. See Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The
New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1156 n.250 (1999)
(discussing the Gallup poll).
189. See Elizabeth Kristen, The Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage Continues, 14
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 104, 114 n.98 (1999); Mark Strasser, Toleration, Approval,
and the Right to Marry: On Constitutional Limitations and Preferential Treatment, 35
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 65, 76 n.57 (2001) (discussing the poll).
190. On this point Rachel Moran comments on “three types of evidence that race
continues to matter in marriage decisions.” MORAN, supra note 154, at 102.
First, although intermarriage rates have risen since Loving, all groups continue
to marry out at rates lower than would be predicted at random. Over 93
percent of whites and blacks marry within their own group, while 70 percent of
Asians and Latinos and 33 percent of Native Americans do. Second,
outmarriage patterns within groups differ for men and women, depending on
how racial and sexual stereotypes interact. Blacks and Asian Americans are
the two groups with the most intense history of racialization through vigorous
application of antimiscegenation laws. These groups show strong gender
differences in outmarriage, arguably as a result of ongoing racialized images of
sexuality. Third, the assimilative power of intermarriage also varies by group.
For example, marrying across the color line is least successful as an
assimilative device for blacks because children of black-white marriages
typically cannot claim the privileges of a white racial heritage.
Id. at 102–03 (footnote omitted).
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Supreme Court Justices in a number of cases.191 A particular type of
tradition-based analysis has been articulated and applied by Justice
Scalia in cases presenting due process and equal protection challenges to
state laws. That methodology is discussed in this Part.
A. The Due Process Clause
Any discussion of Justice Scalia’s traditionalist jurisprudence must
begin with Michael H. v. Gerald D.,192 in which the Court held that a
California statute creating the presumption that a child born to a married
woman living with her husband was a child of the marriage did not
violate the biological father’s procedural and substantive due process
rights. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice Scalia stated that
interpretation of the Due Process Clause is guided and limited by an
insistence that the interest viewed as a fundamental liberty must be an
interest “traditionally protected by our society” and must be a protection
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.”193 The purpose of limiting the clause in this way “is to
prevent future generations from lightly casting aside important
traditional values—not to enable this Court to invent new ones.”194
How are we to identify the relevant tradition(s)? In Michael H.,
Justice Scalia referred to several items in support of his traditionalistic
approach: (1) an 1836 book on adulterine bastardy,195 (2) Blackstone’s
Commentaries,196 (3) the common law of England and the United States
as explicated in 1882 and 1957 works on family law and in Kent’s
Commentaries on American Law,197 and (4) a 1957 American Law
Reports annotation on the presumption of the legitimacy of a child
conceived or born during wedlock.198
The father in Michael H. asserted that he had the right to be declared
191.
192.

See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
491 U.S. 110 (1989). For discussions of this case, see ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 77–109 (2000); and LAURENCE H.
TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 97–109 (1991).
193. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)).
194. Id. at 122 n.2.
195. Id. at 124 (citing H. NICHOLAS, ADULTURINE BASTARDY 1 (1836)).
196. Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 456 (J. Chitty ed. 1826)).
197. Id. at 125.
198. Id. at 125–26 (citing R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Who May Dispute Presumption
of Legitimacy of Child Conceived or Born During Wedlock, 53 A.L.R.2d 572 (1957)).
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the natural father of his daughter and to obtain parental privileges.199
Rejecting that argument, Justice Scalia turned to tradition:
What he [the biological father] must establish . . . is not that our society has
traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to establish paternity,
but that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has
not traditionally denied them. Even if the law in all States had always been that
the entire world could challenge the marital presumption and obtain a
declaration as to who was the natural father, that would not advance Michael’s
claim. Thus, it is ultimately irrelevant . . . that the present law in a number of
States appears to allow the natural father—including the natural father who has
not established a relationship with the child—the theoretical power to rebut the
marital presumption. . . . What counts is whether the States in fact award
substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and
born into, an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the child. We are not
aware of a single case, old or new, that has done so. This is not the stuff of
which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are made.200

In footnote six of his opinion, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia explained and defended his traditionalist analysis. His
approach was not novel, he argued, because in Bowers v. Hardwick201
the Court looked to the sodomy laws of the states in 1868 (the year of
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment), 1961, and 1986 (the year of
its decision).202 “[W]e concluded from that record, regarding that very
199. Michael H. and Carole D. (who was married to Gerald D.) had an affair. In
May 1981, Carole gave birth to Victoria D. Gerald was listed as the father on the birth
certificate and held Victoria out as his child. Carole subsequently informed Michael that
she believed that Michael could be the father of the child. A blood test showed, by a
probability of 98.07 percent, that Michael was Victoria’s biological father. Michael held
Victoria out as his child when Carole visited him. Carole then lived with another man,
Scott K.; she later returned to and lived with Gerald, and then left Gerald and lived with
Michael. After signing a stipulation that Michael was Victoria’s natural father, Carole
left Michael and reconciled with Gerald. Michael and Victoria brought a court action
seeking certain rights. See id. at 113–15. Gerald argued that, under California law, “the
issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.” Id. at 115 (quoting CAL. EVID.
CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)). That presumption could be rebutted by blood tests
upon motion of either the wife or the husband within two years of the date of the child’s
birth. Id. (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621 (c)–(d) (repealed 1994; current version at CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 7540–7541 (West 1994 & Supp. 2003))). The trial court granted
summary judgment to Gerald, and that ruling was affirmed by the California appellate
court. See id. at 115–16.
200. Id. at 126–27.
201. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For an illuminating essay discussing this case, see
generally Sidney Buchanan, A Constitutional Cross-Road for Gay Rights, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 1269 (2001).
202. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6. In concluding that there was no fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, the Bowers Court reasoned:
Proscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots. Sodomy was a criminal
offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal
sodomy laws. In fact, until 1961, all 50 States outlawed sodomy, and today,
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specific aspect of sexual conduct, that ‘to claim that a right to engage in
such conduct is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” is, at best, facetious.’”203
And, he continued, in Roe v. Wade204 the Court “spent about a fifth of
our opinion negating the proposition that there was a longstanding
tradition of laws proscribing abortion.”205
Justice Scalia then opined that the Court should “refer to the most
specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified.”206 Selecting the most
specific level of generality avoids the problem of “imprecise guidance”
provided by general traditions and the additional problem of judges
dictating, rather than discerning, society’s views.207 In his view, reference
to the most specific level avoids arbitrary decisionmaking, does not leave
“judges free to decide as they think best when the unanticipated occurs,”
and promotes the rule of law because a rule “that binds neither by text nor
by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.”208
24 States and the District of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties
for sodomy performed in private and between consenting adults. Against this
background, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty” is, at best, facetious.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–94 (citations and footnotes omitted).
203. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194).
204. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
205. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
206. Id. at 127–28 n.6.
207. Id. at 128 n.6.
208. Id. In Justice O’Connor’s view, Justice Scalia’s footnote “sketches a mode of
historical analysis . . . that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past decisions in this
area.” Id. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part). Citing Loving v. Virginia and other
cases, Justice O’Connor wrote that “the Court has characterized relevant traditions
protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be ‘the most specific
level’ available.” Id. Accordingly, she “would not foreclose the unanticipated by the
prior imposition of a single mode of historical analysis.” Id.
Dissenting, Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun) objected that
tradition “can be as malleable and as elusive as ‘liberty’ itself.” Id. at 137 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan did not argue that tradition was irrelevant, for he noted that
running through the Court’s decisions is “the theme that certain interests and practices—
freedom from physical restraint, marriage, childbearing, childrearing, and others—form
the core of our definition of ‘liberty.’” Id. at 139. Justice Brennan noted that, rather than
asking whether parenthood is an interest historically protected by the Court (“the answer
to that question is too clear for dispute,” id.), the plurality instead asked “whether the
specific variety of parenthood under consideration—a natural father’s relationship with a
child whose mother is married to another man—has enjoyed such protection.” Id. “If
we had asked, therefore, [in other cases] whether the specific interest under consideration
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Having set forth his traditionalist analysis in Michael H., Justice
Scalia adhered to the approach in subsequent due process cases. In
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,209 his concurring
opinion argued that no substantive due process claim of a right to
assisted suicide could be maintained “unless the claimant demonstrates
that the State has deprived him of a right historically and traditionally
protected against state interference.”210 Tradition did not support the
right asserted in Cruzan, he argued, first, because suicide resulted in
criminal liability under English common law. Second, case law at the
time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment generally
criminalized suicide, with twenty-one of the thirty-seven states and
eighteen of the ratifying states prohibiting assisted suicide. Further, a
proposed penal law system presented to the United States House of
Representatives in 1828 would have criminalized assisted suicide; the
penal code adopted in the Dakota Territory in 1877 prohibited attempted
and assisted suicide; and most states without an explicit assisted suicide
prohibition in 1868 recognized that assisted and attempted suicide were
unlawful in the fifty years following the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.211 “Thus, ‘there is no significant support for the claim that
a right to suicide is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”212 As
neither the text of the Constitution nor tradition said anything about the
issue, Justice Scalia was concerned that:
[t]o raise up a constitutional right here we would have to create out of
nothing . . . some constitutional principle whereby, although the State may insist
that an individual come in out of the cold and eat food, it may not insist that he
take medicine; and although it may pump his stomach empty of poison he has
ingested, it may not fill his stomach with food he has failed to ingest.213

had been traditionally protected, the answer would have been a resounding ‘no.’ That
we did not ask this question in those cases highlights the novelty of the interpretive
method that the plurality opinion employs today.” Id. at 139–40.
For discussions of Justice Scalia’s and Justice Brennan’s views on and uses of
tradition in Michael H., see DAVID E. MARION, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE WILLIAM
J. BRENNAN, JR.: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF “LIBERTARIAN DIGNITY” 101–04 (1997);
FRANK I. MICHELMAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY 104–08 (1999); J.M. Balkin,
Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613,
1614–29 (1990). See generally Robin West, The Ideal of Liberty: A Comment on
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1373 (1991).
209. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit a
state from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s wishes
regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and refusal of lifesaving hydration
and nutrition).
210. Id. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
211. Id. at 294–95.
212. Id. at 295 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
213. Id. at 300. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan also looked to tradition:

320

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

[VOL. 40: 285, 2003]

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

Applying Scalian Traditionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,214 Justice Scalia’s traditionalist
approach was expressly addressed in the joint opinion for the Court
issued by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. In the course of
reaffirming the essential holding of Roe v. Wade,215 the joint opinion
stated:
It is . . . tempting . . . to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those
practices, defined at the most specific level, that were protected against
government interference by other rules of law when the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified. But such a view would be inconsistent with our law. It is a
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before. Marriage
is mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and interracial marriage was illegal
in most States in the 19th century, but the Court was no doubt correct in finding
it to be an aspect of liberty protected against state interference by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia.216

The Court further stated: “Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific
practices of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”217 It is an “inescapable
fact,” the Court wrote, that “reasoned judgment” must be exercised in
the adjudication of substantive due process claims.218
“The right to be free from medical attention without consent, to determine what shall be
done with one’s own body, is deeply rooted in this Nation’s traditions . . . .” Id. at 305
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 343 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
Our duty, and the concomitant freedom, to come to terms with the conditions
of our own mortality are undoubtedly ‘so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental’ . . . .
....
. . . Our ethical tradition has long regarded an appreciation of mortality as
essential to understanding life’s significance.
Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
214. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
215. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
216. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 847–48 (joint opinion).
217. Id. at 848.
218. Id. at 849. On this point, Justice Scalia retorted that reasoned judgment “turns
out to be nothing but philosophical predilection and moral intuition.” Id. at 1000 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia predicted that going beyond
text and tradition, which are “facts to study,” to value-based constitutional adjudication
will change public perception of the Court, and “a free and intelligent people’s attitudes
towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different. The people know that
their value judgments are quite as good as those taught in any law school—maybe
better.” Id. at 1000–01.
In a subsequent decision, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), the Court, by a
five to four vote, held that a Nebraska statute criminalizing the performance of “partial
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Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Thomas, disagreed with the Court’s analysis. Abortion is not a
liberty protected by the Constitution, Justice Scalia argued, “not because
of anything so exalted as my views concerning the ‘concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life,’”219 but
“because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution says absolutely
nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American society
have permitted it to be legally proscribed.”220 Responding to the joint
opinion’s statement that adhering to tradition would have required the
Court to uphold antimiscegenation laws in Loving v. Virginia, Justice
Scalia asserted that “[a]ny tradition in that case was contradicted by a
text—an Equal Protection Clause that explicitly establishes racial
equality as a constitutional value.”221
The traditionalist analysis of due process claims consistently called for
by Justice Scalia was embraced by a majority of the Court in its 1997
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg.222 There, the Court held that the
Due Process Clause was not violated by a Washington state statute
providing that any person who knowingly caused or aided another
person to attempt suicide was guilty of a felony. Chief Justice Rehnquist
(writing for himself and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas) cited to and relied on Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Cruzan223 and set out two primary features of the Court’s due process
analysis: (1) the protection of “those fundamental rights and liberties
birth abortions” violated the Constitution. Id. at 922. Dissenting, Justice Scalia argued
that the Court’s ruling was:
a democratic vote by nine lawyers, not on the question whether the text of the
Constitution has anything to say about this subject (it obviously does not); nor
even on the question (also appropriate for lawyers) whether the legal traditions
of the American people would have sustained such a limitation upon abortion
(they obviously would); but upon the pure policy question whether this
limitation upon abortion is “undue”—i.e., goes too far.
Id. at 955 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court “should not overcome the judgment of 30
state legislatures,” he wrote, and “should return this matter to the people—where the
Constitution, by its silence on the subject, left it—and let them decide, State by State,
whether this practice should be allowed.” Id. at 955–56.
219. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting the majority opinion).
220. Id.; see also Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that “the Constitution contains no right to abortion”);
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532–37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Roe v. Wade should be overruled).
221. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 980 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
222. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 797 (1997)
(holding that a New York law criminalizing aid to persons in committing or attempting
to commit suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
223. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 713.
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which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’” and (2) “a
‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”224
Philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages oppose and condemn suicide
and assisted suicide, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote.225 As support for that
observation, he referred to seven hundred years of Anglo-American
common-law tradition punishing or otherwise disapproving such acts,
cited Henry de Bracton’s thirteenth century treatise and Blackstone’s
Commentaries, noted the views of the early American colonies as well
as provisions of the Model Penal Code,226 and pointed out that “voters
and legislators continue for the most part to reaffirm their States’
prohibitions on assisting suicide.”227 Employing what he called a
“restrained methodology,” the Chief Justice declared that history, legal
traditions, and practices provide the guideposts for the Court’s
“responsible decisionmaking,” an approach tending to “rein in the
subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial
review.”228
One could understandably read Glucksberg and conclude that Justice
Scalia’s traditionalism had emerged triumphant as the preferred
interpretive methodology in due process cases.229 However, in County of
Sacramento v. Lewis,230 the Court held that a police officer did not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee by causing death
during a high speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspect.
The Court opined that “in such circumstances only a purpose to cause
harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of
arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process
violation.”231 Finding no such purpose in the officer’s instinctive conduct
or any improper or malicious motive, the Court concluded that the chase

224. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
225. Id. at 711.
226. Id. at 711–16.
227. Id. at 716.
228. Id. at 721–22.
229. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 665–66.
230. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
231. Id. at 836. In applying this standard, the Court followed its precedent set forth
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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did not “shock the conscience” and was not unconstitutional.232
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that the Due Process
Clause had not been violated, but lamented that the Court had not
applied the Glucksberg methodology. The Court should have asked
whether the nation had traditionally protected the right asserted by the
party suing the officer and should not have asked whether the officer’s
conduct “shocks my unelected conscience.”233 While the people of
California and their representatives may vote for and prefer a tort law
system holding police officers liable for reckless driving during highspeed chases, Justice Scalia stated, the state had chosen to not hold
public employees liable for civil damages arising from such pursuits.
“But for judges to overrule that democratically adopted policy judgment
on the ground that it shocks their consciences is not judicial review but
judicial governance.”234
B. The Equal Protection Clause
What role does tradition play in Justice Scalia’s analysis of the Equal
Protection Clause? In J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,235 the Court held
that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by intentional genderbased discrimination in employing peremptory strikes in jury selection.
Dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that the Court’s “thoroughly up-to-date
and right-thinking” opinion “disapprov[ing] the male chauvinist attitudes
of our predecessors”236 “imperils a practice that has been considered an
essential part of fair jury trials since the dawn of the common law. The
Constitution of the United States neither requires nor permits this
vandalizing of our people’s traditions.”237
In Romer v. Evans238 the Court held that a Colorado state
constitutional amendment prohibiting the enactment of laws designed to
provide legal protection for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals was “not within
our constitutional tradition”239 and violated the Equal Protection Clause.
Justice Scalia, dissenting, characterized the amendment as a “modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual
232. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855.
233. Id. at 862 (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring). For other examples of Justice Scalia’s
reference to and use of tradition in due process cases, see City of Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 85 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24–25, 27–28, 37–39 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Burnham v.
Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610–23, 627 n.5 (1990) (Scalia, J.).
235. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
236. Id. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 163.
238. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
239. Id. at 633.
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mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores through use of the laws.”240 In his view, the Court’s ruling
frustrated the state’s “reasonable effort to preserve traditional American
moral values,”241 “disparag[ed] as bigotry adherence to traditional
attitudes,”242 and took “sides in the culture wars”243 in a ruling that was
“an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will.”244 As the
Constitution is silent on the subject before the Court, Justice Scalia
would leave it “to be resolved by normal democratic means, including
the adoption of provisions in state constitutions.”245
In a later decision, United States v. Virginia,246 the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause was violated by Virginia’s categorical exclusion
of women from the educational opportunities provided by the Virginia
Military Institute (VMI). That holding was derided by Justice Scalia,
who accused the majority of ignoring the “history of our people” and
counting “for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present,
of men’s military colleges supported by both States and the Federal
Government.”247 Moreover, he stated, the Court deprecated the “closedmindedness of our forebears with regard to women’s education, and
even with regard to the treatment of women in areas that have nothing to
do with education.”248 Such closed-mindedness was, for him, not
problematic:
Closed-minded they were—as every age is, including our own, with regard to
matters it cannot guess, because it simply does not consider them debatable.
240. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 651.
242. Id. at 652.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 653. A recent example of the culture wars and an expression of one
jurist’s views on homosexuality is found in a concurring opinion in a recent child
custody case, D.H. v H.H., 830 So. 2d 21 (Ala. 2002). The concurrence of Chief Justice
Moore, from the Supreme Court of Alabama, stated that: “[h]omosexual conduct is, and
has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a
violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this Nation and our laws
are predicated.” Id. at 26 (Moore, C.J., concurring specially). “It is an inherent evil
against which children must be protected.” Id. Moore’s opinion also referred, among
other things, to the common law of the state, Blackstone’s Commentaries, The Bible, and
early Western legal tradition. Id. at 27–34. “No matter how much society appears to
change, the law on this subject has remained steadfast from the earliest history of the
law, and that law is and must be our law today.” Id. at 35.
245. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996).
246. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
247. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
248. Id.
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The virtue of a democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily
enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted is
not so, and to change their laws accordingly. That system is destroyed if the
smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic process and
written into the Constitution. So to counterbalance the Court’s criticism of our
ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They left us free to change. The
same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court . . . .249

Reiterating his Michael H. analysis,250 Justice Scalia declared that:
the function of this Court is to preserve our society’s values regarding (among
other things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from
the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed upon democratic government,
not to prescribe, on our own authority, progressively higher degrees. For that
reason it is my view that, whatever abstract test we may choose to devise, they
cannot supersede—and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect—those
constant and unbroken national traditions that embody the people’s
understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts. More specifically, it is my
view that “when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of
Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, widespread, and
unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no
proper basis for striking it down.” The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to a
practice asserted to be in violation of the post-Civil War Fourteenth
Amendment.251

249. Id. at 566–67.
250. See supra notes 192–208 and accompanying text.
251. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 568–69 (citations omitted) (quoting
Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). In Rutan, the
Court held that certain political party patronage practices violated the First Amendment.
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 65. Justice Scalia, in his Rutan dissent, wrote that a traditional and
unchallenged practice not explicitly proscribed by constitutional text
is not to be laid on the examining table and scrutinized for its conformity to
some abstract principle of First Amendment adjudication devised by this
Court. To the contrary, such traditions are themselves the stuff out of which
this Court’s principles are to be formed. They are, in these uncertain areas, the
very points of reference by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of other
practices is to be figured out. When it appears that the latest “rule,” or “threepart test,” or “balancing test” devised by the Court has placed us on a collision
course with such a landmark practice, it is the former that must be recalculated
by us, and not the latter that must be abandoned by our citizens. I know of no
other way to formulate a constitutional jurisprudence that reflects, as it should,
the principles adhered to, over time, by the American people, rather than those
favored by the personal (and necessarily shifting) philosophical dispositions of
a majority of this Court.
Id. at 95–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For additional examples of Justice Scalia’s reliance
on tradition in First Amendment cases, see generally California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517–18
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring); Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668, 686–711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (expressing disagreement with the majority
decisions in Umbehr and O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712
(1996)); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 371–85 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
In 44 Liquormart, Justice Scalia reiterated his view that “the long accepted practices of
the American people” guides him in construing the indeterminate “freedom of speech”
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Justice Scalia went on to say that VMI was as
well rooted in the traditions of this country as the tradition of sending only men
into military combat. The people may decide to change the one tradition, like
the other, through democratic processes; but the assertion that either tradition
has been unconstitutional through the centuries is not law, but politicssmuggled-into-law.252

IV. SCALIAN TRADITIONALISM EVALUATED AND APPLIED
This Part evaluates the traditionalist methodology of Justice Scalia, the
“defender of traditional values,”253 and then applies his approach to the
constitutional challenges to separate-but-equal and antimiscegenation laws
in Brown v. Board of Education254 and Loving v. Virginia,255 respectively.
A. Scalian Traditionalism: Why and Which Tradition?
Justice Scalia’s reliance on tradition raises, among others, these two
questions: (1) Why should we look to tradition in assessing
contemporary constitutional issues and in deciding between the
maintenance of the status quo or a change in established laws and
practices? (2) How do we locate the pertinent tradition or traditions
applicable to a particular case?
As for the “why tradition” query, Justice Scalia believes that his
traditionalist approach prevents the casting aside of “important
text of the First Amendment. 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring). He considered
more relevant the state legislative practices prevalent at the time the First
Amendment was adopted, since almost all of the States had free speech
constitutional guarantees of their own, whose meaning was not likely to have
been different from the federal constitutional provision derived from them.
Perhaps more relevant still are the state legislative practices at the time the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, since it is most improbable that that
adoption was meant to overturn any existing national consensus regarding free
speech.
Id. Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not vote with a majority of the Court in decisions
holding that flag burning prohibitions violated the First Amendment. See United States
v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). He explained
that while he does not “like scruffy people who burn the American flag,” he was bound
by the text of the First Amendment. David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics:
An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J.
1377, 1423 (1999).
252. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
253. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 192, at 103.
254. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
255. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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traditional values,”256 deters judicial dictation (as opposed to judicial
discernment) of society’s views,257 promotes the rule of law,258
discourages judicial invention of new values and constitutional rights,259
avoids the problem of negative public perception arising from rulings
not reflecting tradition,260 promotes and protects democratic procedures
and outcomes,261 and serves as a means to identify and check “politicssmuggled-into-law.”262
This view of the need for and the value of tradition has great faith in
and gives operative force to established legal and societal views
concerning the legitimacy or illegitimacy of certain conduct and
practices.263 In assessing the constitutionality of a state’s law regulating
256. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989) (Scalia, J.). Such
recognition and protection of (if not reverence for) tradition reflects respect for that
“which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present.” EDWARD SHILS,
TRADITION 12 (1981). Tradition can “structure at least some parts of social life . . . as
unchanging and invariant” and tends to “develop a set of . . . conventions and routines,
which may be de facto or de jure formalized for purposes of imparting the practice to
new practitioners.” Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE
INVENTION OF TRADITION 1, 2–3 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1984). Also
used to justify and legitimize authority, tradition is communicated to persons who
“accept beliefs and adopt customs and practices because of institutional authority.” J.M.
BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 85 (1998). This legitimizing
aspect and effect of tradition can be diluted or even fail altogether when persons question
the established order and experiment with new beliefs and political and social
arrangements. See ELIZABETH COLSON, TRADITION AND CONTRACT: THE PROBLEM OF
ORDER 82 (1974); EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 152
(Conor Cruise O’Brien ed., 1969) (1790). Moreover, the relationship between tradition
and authority implicates another relationship, that between tradition and law, for “all
authority is grounded in the capacity for reasoned elaboration, and legal authority
especially so.” CARL J. FRIEDRICH, TRADITION AND AUTHORITY 113 (1972). Thus,
adhering to traditional values in law can favor and leave in place that which existed prior
to a plaintiff’s constitutional claim.
257. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
258. See id at 127–28.
259. See id. at 122 n.2; see also Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
300 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
260. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999–1001 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 865 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
262. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 569 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. For scholarly agreement with this position, see generally Anthony Kronman,
Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Tradition
and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173. Others have
questioned such legal traditionalism. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 62 (1980); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). See generally Katherine T. Bartlett, Tradition,
Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal Thought, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 303;
John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5
(1978); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 (1991).

328

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

[VOL. 40: 285, 2003]

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

Applying Scalian Traditionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

certain conduct, a traditionalist judge’s decision is not to turn on some
normative notion of what is right or wrong; instead, a jurist’s
adjudicative and descriptive task is to identify and not disturb the
traditional view and position.264 If change is desired, the democratic
process, and not unelected judges, can be turned to and activated for that
purpose. On this view, normative inquiry into whether the challenged
practice is right or wrong, good or bad, or desirable or undesirable is to
be made, not by the courts, but by the people speaking through their
representatives and the laws of the states. What counts is popular
morality reflecting “a majority of opinion about appropriate behavior at
some particular point in time”265 rather than social morality, which is
understood as “moral standards rooted in aspirations for the community
as a whole.”266
This type of traditionalism, and its emphasis on leaving in place the
status quo unless and until it is changed through the democratic process,
can be passively deferential to majoritarian views and edicts. Under
Scalian traditionalism, a particular practice allowed or prohibited at a
certain point in time prior to the constitutional challenge267 may not be
subject to countermajoritarian judicial review268 and invalidation by
264. See RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE
CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 269–70 (1997).
265. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 31 (1997).
266. Id.
267. For present purposes, the relevant point in time is 1868, the year of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra notes 202, 211 and accompanying
text; see infra note 284 and accompanying text.
268. Judicial review and rejection of legislative enactments on constitutional
grounds implicates the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d
ed. 1986). The underlying philosophy of this difficulty is “that American democracy
means majority rule; that the legislatures and executives are majoritarian, but the Court is
countermajoritarian; and that as a result, the Court should invalidate government actions
only when they violate clear constitutional principles that exist apart from the
preferences of the [Supreme Court] Justices.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 61 n.77 (1989). This view of the Court
as a countermajoritarian institution has been questioned by some commentators. See,
e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 190 (1989) (“[T]he views of a
majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long with the
views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country.”); GIRARDEAU A.
SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 19 (1993) (commenting that the Court “is ultimately unable to
protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority,” and is “institutionally incapable of
doing anything other than reflecting the very majoritarian preferences that the traditional
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unelected and unaccountable elitist judges.269 Whether challenged
practices, customs, and traditions are valid and enforceable are questions
to be answered, not by judges, but by the various states acting in and
through majoritarian political processes. Such an approach may be
criticized as “excessively majoritarian,”270 where the majority view
prevails because it is the majority view and not because it is right or just,
even where democracy-as-majoritarianism results in a consequent
dilution, if not elimination, of the rights of minorities.271
Justice Scalia’s invocations of democracy and the will of the people
have great appeal for many, especially when posited as antidotes to the
perceived poisons of the imperial judiciary and robed social engineers.
However, his “bromides of democracy” and complaint that the Court is
undemocratic “begs the question” whether the Constitution requires that
the political system it created be democratic.272 As noted by Richard
Posner, the Constitution “in its inception was rich in undemocratic
features, such as the indirect election of the President and the Senate

model requires the Court to resist”).
Whether the majoritarian paradigm to which the countermajoritarian difficulty thesis
responds accurately accounts for and describes the nation’s political structure has been
the subject of debate. Laura Kalman has argued that the paradigm “ensured the
dedication of constitutional theory to the search for a solution to a problem which did not
exist.” Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarship, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 87, 88 n.8 (1997). In her view, the Constitution is not
based on a concept of purely majoritarian rule, nor is it based on an assumption that only
officials accountable to the electorate can select policies. Id.; see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURTS 20 (2001) (“Our actual existing democracy falls . . . far short of the soaring
ideals of the theorists of democracy . . . .”); id. at 226 (“Ours is not a pure democracy,
and we know . . . that pure democracy is as undesirable as it is unattainable.”); David R.
Dow, The Plain Meaning of Article V, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 117, 119 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)
(reasoning that “not everything ought to be subject” to majority rule and “[f]ollowing the
majority because it is the majority is sometimes obligatory; resisting the majority even
though it is the majority is sometimes required”).
269. Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of
Constitutional Scholarship, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 933, 948 (2001) (“Supreme Court
decisions have been a source of complaint because judges are unelected, oligarchic, and
tyrannical.”); see also Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 714 (1995) (“Mistrust of unelected judges
in America has colonial roots . . . .”).
270. See A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic
Analysis of Tradition’s Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 413
(1999).
271. See id. (Justice Scalia’s “approach . . . insufficiently protects minority rights.”);
MICHELMAN, supra note 208, at 102 (Justice Scalia’s use of the term “tradition”
“evidently refers to what people in the relevant community have actually and regularly
done, not to what they have reflectively approved as right or condemned as wrong.”).
272. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 149
(1999).
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(and against the background of a highly restricted franchise).”273 Other
undemocratic features of the Constitution include two Senators from
each state regardless of population and electoral, rather than popular,
votes as the basis for the election of the President.274 Thus, the
undemocratic Court Justice Scalia criticizes and assails is not the
antidemocratic aberration he claims it to be.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s conception of democracy “requires
judges to be political theorists, so that they know what ‘democracy’ is
(unless we can accept that Justice Scalia himself has said the last word
on that question), and also historians, because it takes a historian to
reconstruct the original meaning of centuries-old documents.”275 A
judge’s conception of democracy and her identification and selection of
the history relevant to the resolution of the constitutional issue before
her flows from and is influenced by that judge’s political theory and
veridical methodology and understanding of the meaning of democracy.
Having placed himself in the position of the protector of certain
traditional democratic practices and institutions, Justice Scalia’s answer
to the “why tradition” query is that tradition recognizes and promotes
democratic outcomes and insulates those outcomes from judicial review.
As for the “which tradition” question, Justice Scalia’s traditionalist
methodology assumes and rests upon the metaphysical, nonepistemological
premise that “there is a tradition waiting out there to be identified,” a
problematic approach in that “inasmuch as every ‘tradition’ harbors the
trace of a ‘counter-tradition,’ the notion that any given ‘tradition’ may be
reduced to an objective, determinative reality is undermined.”276
Recall that Justice Scalia calls for the protection of those interests
defined at the “most specific level at which a relevant tradition
protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be

273. Id.
274. Thus, a presidential candidate with the most popular votes can still lose an
election. See SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 38–40; JEFFREY
TOOBIN, TOO CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-SIX-DAY BATTLE TO DECIDE THE 2000
ELECTION 275, 280–81 (2001). See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME
INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); POSNER, supra note
268. For more on the undemocratic aspects of the United States political structure, see
DANIEL A FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 148–51 (2002).
275. POSNER, supra note 272, at 150.
276. Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 73 (1995).
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identified.”277 Several questions immediately come to mind. Why the
most specific level? What is the most specific level? Will judges agree
or disagree in answering those questions and on what bases? And is
Justice Scalia’s highest level of specificity inquiry really helpful in
identifying and selecting a—or the—pertinent tradition, or does this
approach actually render all cases ones of first impression?278 If all
cases are ones of first impression, each case will require a search for the
relevant tradition upon which resolution of that specific case will rest.
One would and should expect more from a purportedly explanatory and
predictive methodology.
Because traditions “do not select themselves,”279 jurists identifying the
most specific tradition from a menu of possible or plausible traditions
necessarily must employ discretion and reason, make choices, and act
normatively in deciding and defining that which constitutes the most
specific and relevant tradition applicable to a particular case. If this is
correct, Justice Scalia’s traditionalism has an element of subjectivity and
can lead to the very same or similar judicial dictation and predilectionbased decisionmaking he decries. The importance of this point lies in its
analytical departure from one posited advantage of the Justice’s
approach—the provision of “a touchstone outside the judge’s own
perceptions.”280
As previously noted, in identifying traditions Justice Scalia has looked
to, among other things, treatises and publications (including commentaries
by Blackstone, Kent, and Story);281 the common law of England and the
United States;282 practices bearing the “endorsement of a long tradition
of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the
277. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.).
278. See SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY, supra note 10, at 86 (“Defined at the
highest level of specificity, every case is one of first impression and sui generis. No case
is exactly like a case that has come before. We can always identify features of a current
case that distinguish it from the specific tradition invoked on the plaintiff’s behalf.”
(footnote omitted)).
279. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 175 (1996).
280. David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated
Fundamental Rights?: Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 795, 860 (1996). As argued by two commentators, Justice Scalia’s opinion
in Michael H. reeked with the Justice’s perceptions:
His entire opinion is a demonstration of the limitless license that judges
acquire to reify or deify their predilections when they pretend to themselves or
others that their job involves no interpretive work but consists simply of
sorting the objective facts of cases into the objective categories of objective
rules.
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 192, at 108.
281. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 195–98 and accompanying text.
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beginning of the Republic;”283 and the laws of the states in 1868, the
year the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. With respect to the latter
indicant, Justice Scalia has urged that questions as to the application of
the Equal Protection Clause should be answered
on the basis of the “time-dated” meaning of equal protection in 1868. Unisex
toilets and women assault troops may be ideas whose time has come, and the
people are certainly free to require them by legislation; but refusing to do so
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, because that is not what “equal
protection of the laws” ever meant.284

Under Scalian traditionalism, reliance on general notions of tradition
will not do, for such generalizations do not sufficiently tether judges to
“time-dated” meanings of constitutional provisions. That, for him, is
problematic, for judges should not tell society what traditional views and
practices are or are not, or should or should not be, constitutional and
acceptable. Backward looking and protective of the status quo, Scalian
traditionalism is grounded in and preservative of traditional policies and
institutions and “the actual practices of the society, as reflected in the
laws enacted by its legislatures.”285
B. What About Brown and Loving?
Consider Justice Scalia’s traditionalism, and recall the factual, social,
and legal settings forming the backdrop of the Brown litigation. In the
Segregation Cases, the State defendants, relying on Plessy v.
Ferguson,286 argued that segregation was a legislative matter for the
several states;287 contended that a number of the states ratifying the
283. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
an opinion involving the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Justice Scalia wrote
an opinion for the Court in which he conceded, as largely true but irrelevant, that the
Court’s description of the understanding of land ownership informing that clause was
“not supported by early American experience.” Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992). “The practices of the States prior to
incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses . . . were out of accord with
any plausible interpretation of those provisions.” Id. As asked by one scholar, “What
happened to the interpretive rule of text and contemporaneous tradition?” Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 81
(1992).
284. SCALIA, supra note 2, at 149.
285. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1184 (1989).
286. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
287. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 had or soon thereafter created
segregated schools;288 and advised the Court that segregation was
consistent with then-extant customs, traditions, and mores.289 Those
arguments have much in common with Justice Scalia’s traditionalism,
for he too looks to the state of the law as of 1868; is protective of and
seeks to preserve the nation’s history and tradition (as he defines them);
and, in certain areas, would allow states to resolve for themselves what
is permitted and proscribed without fear of federal court intervention and
policy dictation.290
As applied to Brown, could Scalian traditionalism lead to the
conclusion that public school segregation was not unconstitutional?
That question can be answered in the affirmative, for under a time-dated
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, such segregation was not
unconstitutional in 1868. The states defending against the plaintiffs’
constitutional challenges feared that they would no longer be allowed to
do that which they had done traditionally—segregate Black and White
children in public school education. In their view, the question whether
segregation was or was not permissible was one for the democratic
process of the several states and not for judges with their own policy
preferences and philosophical predilections. On that view, longstanding
and entrenched public school segregation did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Court’s contrary conclusion failed to
recognize and give due regard to tradition. The fact that the Court had
held that the separate-but-equal doctrine was unconstitutional in
graduate school settings did not call for a different result, as those cases
did not involve the most specific tradition protecting or denying
protection to the asserted right—the application of segregation in
secondary education.
Justice Scalia has argued that his traditionalist analysis is not
applicable to the issue presented in Brown. Responding to Justice
Stevens’s concurring opinion in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,291
Justice Scalia said that:
The customary invocation of Brown v. Board of Education as demonstrating the
dangerous consequences of this principle is unsupportable. I argue for the role
of tradition in giving content only to ambiguous constitutional text; no tradition
can supersede the Constitution. In my view the Fourteenth Amendment’s
288. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Parts III, IV.A.
291. 497 U.S. 62 (1990). In that concurrence, Justice Stevens noted that “[i]f the
age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient reason for its continued acceptance, the
constitutional attack on racial discrimination would, of course, have been doomed to
failure.” Id. at 82 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Ill. State Employees Union v. Lewis,
473 F.2d 561, 568 n.14 (7th Cir. 1972)).

334

PRINTERTURNER.DOC

[VOL. 40: 285, 2003]

1/15/2020 4:38 PM

Applying Scalian Traditionalism
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

requirement of “equal protection of the laws,” combined with the Thirteenth
Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black slavery, leaves no room for
doubt that laws treating people differently because of their race are invalid.
Moreover, even if one does not regard the Fourteenth Amendment as crystal
clear on this point, a tradition of unchallenged validity did not exist with respect
to the practice in Brown. To the contrary, in the 19th century the principle of
“separate-but-equal” had been vigorously opposed on constitutional grounds,
litigated up to this Court, and upheld only over the dissent of one of our
historically most respected Justices.292

In arguing that the text of the Equal Protection Clause, when
combined with the Thirteenth Amendment,293 prohibited segregation and
did not require resort to tradition, Justice Scalia moved from
traditionalism to textualism.294 That move is premised upon the Justice’s
conclusion that the text of the Equal Protection Clause is unambiguous
as applied to matters of race generally and Brown specifically.295 The
unambiguity of the text, while plausible and arguable, is not automatic
or obvious and reflects Justice Scalia’s choice as to the proper reading
292. Id. at 95–96 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
293. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
294. See discussion supra note 23. Justice Scalia could have, but did not make an
originalist argument in support of his position. Such an argument has been noted by one
scholar:
Warren seemed to be proclaiming that racial segregation was always
unconstitutional, regardless of time and place. This traditional conception of
constitutional interpretation assumes that constitutional meaning is
unchanging, and that what the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment meant when it was adopted in 1868 is what it has continued to
mean today. Under this view, when the Court declared racial segregation
unconstitutional in 1954, it also meant that Plessy was wrongly decided in
1896.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 28 (1998).
For a discussion of an unsuccessful attempt by another jurist and scholar, Robert Bork,
to square the result in Brown with the Fourteenth Amendment, see FARBER & SHERRY,
supra note 274, at 22–25. See generally Ronald Turner, Was “Separate but Equal”
Constitutional?: Borkian Originalism and Brown, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 229
(1995).
295. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 95 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That same text was
viewed by Justice Scalia as ambiguous in United States v. Virginia. See 518 U.S. 515,
568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Is the text of the Equal Protection Clause, arguably
unambiguous when applied to questions of racial discrimination, ambiguous when
applied to sex discrimination? “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. As a
matter of text, it is not apparent that the clause is unambiguous in one context (race) and
ambiguous in another (sex). While it could be argued that the clause is ambiguous when
applied to a subject (sex discrimination) not contemplated by the framers of the
amendment, that argument references the amendment’s purpose and not its text. Justice
Scalia has not offered an explanation for his different readings of the clause.
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and meaning of the constitutional language. Of course, for decades that
same text was read by states and localities who supported and believed
that segregation was constitutional and not violative of the equal
protection mandate. Given the Justice’s traditionalism, one would have
thought that what counts is the states’ readings and not the views of
unelected Justice Scalia.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s coupling of the Equal Protection Clause
with the Thirteenth Amendment is extratextual, for nothing in the text of the
Constitution says that those amendments should be read together. That is
not to say that Justice Scalia’s combination analysis is incorrect. It is to say
that the Justice is making and implementing an interpretive choice with
respect to the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to public
school segregation, a choice leading to a result different from that which
could have been reached under traditionalism. As for Justice Scalia’s
additional argument that there was no “tradition of unchallenged validity”
with respect to school segregation and that the practice had been
“vigorously opposed on constitutional grounds” in the nineteenth century,296
his focus on constitutional and oppositional challenges are again departures
from the central tenets of his traditionalism. That challenges had been
brought and segregation opposed should not obscure and does not negate
the fact that those challenges were rejected by states tenaciously holding
onto traditional segregation; thus, it could be argued that the unsuccessful
challenges made clear and reinforced the segregative regime officially
interred by Brown in 1954.
Were antimiscegenation laws traditional and therefore constitutional?
Recall that such laws were part of the established mores and practices in
the post-Civil War era and were consciously put in place to preserve
White Supremacy and to maintain the White dominated racial hierarchy.297
When the issue came before the Supreme Court in 1967 in a challenge to
Virginia’s antimiscegenation law, the state argued that the Court should
look to and not change the antimiscegenation laws of the states ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, should recognize that a number of
states kept those laws in place as late as 1951, and should note that
Congress and federal and state courts did not question the
constitutionality of antimiscegenation.298 Whether the policies promoted
by and reflected in state antimiscegenation laws should govern the
relationships between Blacks and Whites was a question to be answered
by each state and not by the judiciary.299
296.
297.
298.
299.
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As applied to Loving, Scalian traditionalism could lead to the
conclusion that Virginia’s antimiscegenation law was constitutional
under a time-dated understanding of the Equal Protection Clause, one
which looked to laws, practices, and norms circa 1868 and to subsequent
developments. The traditionalist approach’s protection of democratic
outcomes reflected in a state’s law would also be furthered by a
methodology recognizing that state’s right to set policy, even racially
discriminatory policy, free from judicial oversight and invalidation. The
Lovings and others who sought abolition of Virginia’s antimiscegenation
law could turn to the political process, an unattractive and hopeless
exercise,300 for what must be conserved is tradition in the face of current
views and faddishness. To those who argue that this approach will leave
in place ugly, harmful, and subordinating practices and ways of life, the
true traditionalist’s response should be that, while this may be so, the
Constitution is not to be used to impose nontraditionalist views. On that
view, respect for tradition, and not aversion to repugnancy, is the
constitutional standard.
As with Brown, Justice Scalia has argued that adherence to tradition
would not have required the Court to uphold antimiscegenation laws. In
his partial concurrence and partial dissent in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,301 he said: “Any tradition in that case was contradicted by a
text—an Equal Protection Clause that explicitly establishes racial
equality as a constitutional value.”302 The Justice thus argues that the
Equal Protection Clause’s text and equality principle has always
prohibited antimiscegenation laws. But is that so? State and federal
courts reading and applying the same text routinely upheld such laws
against equal protection challenges. The Supreme Court at one time
reasoned that the equality principle was satisfied so long as Blacks and
Whites were punished equally.303 In the Loving oral argument before the
Court, Virginia’s counsel, who was surely aware of the applicable
constitutional language, noted that miscegenation had been prohibited
“without any question being raised as to the authority of the state to
exercise this power.”304
300. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
301. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
302. Id. at 980 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
303. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text.
304. Oral Argument Apr. 10, 1967, at 41, Loving v. Virginia, 147 S.E.2d 78 (Va.
1966) (No. 395), reprinted in 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 69, at
1000.
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That antimiscegenation laws were not declared unconstitutional by the
Court before 1967 itself says something about the purported clarity of the
constitutional text and principle. If one concludes (as does the Author)
that applying the Equal Protection Clause to antimiscegenation laws is not
self-obviously contradicted by text, tradition must still be reckoned
with.305 For the reasons stated, that reckoning is problematic for those
who posit that traditionalism would not validate antimiscegenation laws.
V. CONCLUSION
“I take the need for theoretical legitimacy seriously,”306 Justice Scalia
has remarked. The Justice has also expressed his view that “[i]t is quite
impossible for the courts, creatures and agents of the people of the
United States, to impose upon those people of the United States norms
that those people themselves (through their democratic institutions) have
not accepted,”307 as “we judges of the American democracies are
servants of our peoples, sworn to apply, without fear or favor, the laws
that those peoples deem appropriate.”308
Were separate-but-equal and antimiscegenation laws constitutional
under Justice Scalia’s traditionalist approach to constitutional
interpretation? Taking seriously the legitimacy of the traditionalist
methodology and that the view of the people, rather than the courts, is
paramount, the foregoing question could be answered in the affirmative
for the reasons discussed in this Article. As also discussed, Justice Scalia
has taken the position that tradition did not require different results in
Brown and Loving because the text of the Equal Protection Clause was
dispositive. Leaving it to the reader to decide whether that position is
tenable and persuasive, it is the Author’s view that the constitutional text
does not explicitly resolve the challenges presented in those seminal cases
and that separate-but-equal and antimiscegenation laws could have
survived as matters of law under unmodified Scalian traditionalism.
In light of the Justice’s move from tradition to text, questions remain
as to the application and outcome of traditionalism, and any exceptions
thereto, in race discrimination and other cases. Although those questions
305. The Loving Court also held that Virginia’s law violated the Due Process
Clause. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). While Justice Scalia did not address
the law under that clause, it is worth noting that miscegenation could be constitutionally
valid under his traditionalism with the referents of the longstanding traditions of society
including the relevant laws of 1868 and thereafter, case law at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the democratically adopted policy judgments of the
states. Id. at 7.
306. Scalia, supra note 23, at 862.
307. Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 1119 (1996).
308. Id. at 1122.
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warrant further inquiry and analysis, society is indeed fortunate that the
Supreme Court did not adhere to tradition and was able “to see past the
wreck of our own ancestors’ failings.”309 In holding that the explicitly
and formally racist institutions and practices attacked in Brown and
Loving were unconstitutional, the Court “held unconstitutional wellsettled and long-established practices . . . in the name of higher
constitutional values”310 and “refuted those who believed that Supreme
Court should respect settled customs and local traditions when those
customs and traditions oppressed minorities, the politically unpopular,
and the weak.”311 That refutation, and not a reverence for and continuation
of entrenched and traditional discriminatory practices, is a significant
development in our constitutional history.

309. WALTER MOSLEY, WORKIN’ ON
HAND OF HISTORY 32 (2000).
310. Balkin, supra note 107, at 15.
311. Id. at 16.
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